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ABSTRACT 
 In 2013, a Government Accountability Report gap analysis on the state of joint 
professional military education (JPME) identified deficiencies in many areas that are 
critical to success in the defense support to civil authorities (DSCA) mission. This thesis 
utilized a case study methodology to discover the leadership qualities required of DSCA 
officers and ways that the Joint Qualification System could be modified to develop 
DSCA leaders. Cases of the downrange mission and the homeland mission were 
examined. This thesis found that the downrange mission has evolved significantly since 
World War II’s industrial age under MacArthur, past Operation Eagle Claw and the 
resulting Goldwater–Nichols Act, into Desert Storm, and finally to Operation Iraqi 
Freedom’s information age under McChrystal. The homeland mission has evolved on a 
path that parallels the downrange mission by failing during Hurricane Katrina, enacting 
the dual-status commander concept, and succeeding at Superstorm Sandy. However, the 
homeland mission has yet to evolve toward the kind of shared leadership and adaptability 
required in the complex information age. Recommendations include evolving the JQS to 
include DSCA specific paths, leveraging the National Guard as well as the best and 
brightest universities and academia throughout the nation, and modifying the Center for 
Homeland Defense and Security’s graduate program to qualify as JPME II credit. 
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The Department of Defense (DoD) owns the downrange mission, but it is also a 
critical player in the homeland mission. DoD leadership development is focused heavily 
on the downrange mission but gives only notional consideration to the homeland mission. 
In 2005, Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) claimed the lives of 846 Americans, yet during  
a single event beginning on August 23, 2005, Hurricane Katrina claimed the lives of 
1,833 Americans.1 These figures tell a tale of evolution. While they are from the same year, 
they highlight the fact that leadership development for the homeland mission was (and still 
is) far to the left on the evolutionary continuum while leadership development for the 
downrange mission was (and still is) far to the right. The construct that the DoD uses to 
develop military leaders has evolved over time. It must further evolve to include content 
with a primary focus on defense support to civil authorities (DSCA). Searching for ways 
to improve DoD leadership development for the DSCA mission involves research focused 
on three areas.  
The first area examines how the world is evolving so that conclusions can be made 
about what leadership qualities are required of DSCA officers. This research reveals that 
because the world is evolving, so too is leadership theory. Vertical leadership theories 
dominated the industrial age. Traits, behaviors, and motivations seemed to be the 
proscriptive recipe for the top-down “hero” leader during an industrial age of efficiency. 
The efficiency-based industrial age, however, has given way to the information age. This 
transition has been a game-changer and has had a profound impact on leadership theory. 
In the information age, nearly everyone has access to nearly everything, nearly 
instantaneously. Consequently, all of us undoubtedly know more than one of us. Today’s 
leader cannot possibly know all the answers, so leadership theory has evolved to include 
 
1 “American Soldiers Killed in Iraq up to 2018,” Statista, accessed September 3, 2018, https://www. 
statista.com/statistics/263798/american-soldiers-killed-in-iraq/; “Fatalities by Year and Country: Iraq,” 
iCasualties, accessed August 21, 2019, http://icasualties.org/; and Adam Levenson, “Decade of 
Destruction: The High Cost of Hurricanes [Infographic],” University of North Carolina, September 30, 
2014, https://onlinempa.unc.edu/decade-destruction-high-cost-hurricanes-infographic/. 
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not only the vertical leadership theory from the past but also theories of shared leadership 
that can tap into the minds of many.  
The second area examines how the downrange mission is evolving. In addition to 
the transition from the industrial age to the information age, this research revealed another 
transition: from complicated to complex. Complicated is like a mechanical factory 
machine; although there are many moving parts—one connected to and interacting with 
the next—altering a component generally has predictable and linear results. On the other 
hand, complex is like the cell phone network of Al Qaeda in which every player is 
connected to and interacts with every other player, and outcomes are exponential and 
unpredictable. As a result, the downrange mission has evolved from the rigid top-down 
MacArthur leadership approach from World War II, silos and command; to the shared 
leadership approach of Schwarzkopf in the Gulf War, commanding teams; to the bottom-
up agile and adaptable approach of McChrystal in Operation Iraqi Freedom, commanding 
a team of teams.  
The third area examines how the homeland mission is evolving. Given the transition 
from the industrial age to the information age and a transition from complicated to 
complex, has homeland leadership development evolved in parallel with the downrange 
mission? In parallel, yes. The errors of silos and command in WW II and Operation Eagle 
Claw in Iran were course-corrected by the mandate of the Goldwater–Nichols Act. 
Similarly, the DSCA errors of Hurricane Katrina were course-corrected by the creation of 
the dual-status commander, but that evolutionary progress was separated by decades, and 
the downrange mission has continued to evolve while the homeland mission has stagnated.  
Academia says that leadership theory is evolving beyond vertical leadership styles 
to include shared leadership qualities. Case studies of practitioners in the field, both 
downrange and in the homeland, both governmental and corporate, also reveal a transition 
away from hierarchical solutions toward bottom-up solutions. The downrange mission has 
evolved from command to commanding teams, to commanding a team of teams. The 
homeland DSCA mission has evolved in the same way but has yet to fully embrace the 
latter approach. Investing in a DSCA-focused Joint Qualification System (JQS) is the way 
to make it happen. Upon reviewing research about the evolving world and blending it with 
 xvii 
research on the evolution of academic, downrange practitioner, homeland practitioner, 
corporate, and government views on leadership, some JQS recommendations become 
rather intuitive.  
The first recommendation is to evolve the JQS to include content with a DSCA 
focus, bringing the homeland mission to the evolutionary state of the downrange mission. 
Second, as the National Guard Network is uniquely positioned in the DSCA mission, it 
should be leveraged as a JQS multiplier. Third, implement some available “plug-and-play” 
solutions to modify the JQS at a low cost. Fourth, while the current rigid JQS structure is 
a dinosaur of the past, there is a way for it to become adaptive and agile, accessing the best 
and brightest professors, institutions, students, and experiences throughout the nation 
rather than accepting only those who are willing and able to fit in the current top-down JQS 
structure.
 xviii 
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The Goldwater–Nichols Act (GNA) of 1986 was one of the most significant 
overhauls in the history of the Department of Defense (DoD). Failures during Operation 
Eagle Claw, the Iran hostage rescue in 1980, was the impetus for the GNA, but DoD joint 
operability challenges had been known for decades.1 Interservice rivalry was the root cause 
of those challenges, and that flaw was also obvious to U.S. allies during World War II 
(WWII). A British air marshal once said, “The violence of inter-service rivalry in the 
United States had to be seen to be believed and was an appreciable handicap to their  
[the U.S.] war effort.”2 From the outside looking in, the dysfunction was obvious, but it 
took 40 years, a failed rescue, and an act of Congress to force the DoD to start thinking 
in terms of an integrated, rather than a service-centric, organization. The “joint matters” 
philosophy and the Joint Qualification System (JQS) construct provided by the GNA have 
proven an effective template for developing joint leaders for the downrange mission, but 
there is a glaring gap in developing joint leaders for the homeland-focused DSCA mission.  
In October 2013, the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) issued a 
report to Congress on joint professional military education (JPME). As described in the 
GAO report titled Actions Needed to Implement DoD Recommendations for Enhancing 
Leadership Development, “The MECC [Military Education Coordination Council] . . . 
conducted a gap analysis to identify and crosswalk the desired leader attributes for Joint 
Force 2020 with the current officer and enlisted personnel JPME education continuums.”3 
According to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, “The MECC principals are: DJ-7 [deputy directors–
joint force development]; the presidents, commandants, and directors of the joint and 
Service universities and colleges; and the heads of any other JPME-accredited institutions. 
 
1 Richard A. Radvanyi, “Operation Eagle Claw: Lessons Learned” (master’s thesis, U.S. Marine Corps 
Command and Staff College, 2002), http://www.dtic.mil/docs/citations/ADA402471. 
2 James R. Locher III, “Has It Worked?: The Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization Act,” Naval War 
College Review 54, no. 4 (Autumn 2001): 95–115. 
3 Brenda S. Farrell, Joint Military Education: Actions Needed to Implement DOD Recommendations 
for Enhancing Leadership Development (Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office, October 
2013), 13, https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-14-29. 
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The MECC Chairman may invite representatives from other commands and organizations 
as appropriate.”4 The report highlights gaps in the JPME curricula for meeting desired 
leader attributes. More specifically, the GAO’s report highlights areas that are directly 
related to the DSCA mission:  
The MECC found that the 2010 HASC [House Armed Services Committee] 
report, for example, provided a detailed assessment of the state of JPME, 
and concluded that while the overall PME [professional military education] 
system was basically sound, some areas needed improvement, such as an 
increased emphasis on joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and 
multinational operations.5 
An argument can be made that the inter-agency environment of today is not unlike 
the inter-service environment of a pre-GNA DoD, where silos, waste, and turf wars 
prevailed. Leadership development is continually evolving, and varied theater 
environments and command authorities will require various solutions. Downrange, the 
DoD is accustomed to being the first-string quarterback in the theater of operations. 
Conversely, the homeland mission is not top-down with a DoD quarterback running the 
game plan. In the homeland, federalism and the Posse Comitatus Act relegate the DoD to 
a sixth-string status, even behind other federal agencies. Homeland missions are dealt with 
in a bottom-up approach, going from local to state, to state militia, to other states via 
Emergency Management Assistance Compacts, to federal, and finally to the DoD, as 
lower-level capacities are progressively exceeded.  
This bottom-up DSCA environment offers some unique challenges for the DoD, 
but it also offers some unique opportunities. Evolving the JQS to leverage these unique 
opportunities may be the answer to developing DSCA leaders and closing the gap identified 
in the GAO report by improving joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational 
operations. The current JQS construct is geared toward leadership development that 
emphasizes leading the downrange mission and gives only notional consideration to 
supporting the homeland mission. In 1986, the GNA forced the DoD to evolve from inter-
 
4 “Military Education Coordination Council (MECC),” Joint Chiefs of Staff, accessed November 4, 
2018, http://www.jcs.mil/Doctrine/Joint-Education/MECC2018/. 
5 Farrell, Joint Military Education, 17. 
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service rivalry to the “whole of DoD” and the JQS concept. It is now time for JQS to evolve 
from a whole-of-DoD to a “whole-of-government” approach.  
A. RESEARCH DESIGN 
DoD directives and the opinions of DoD leadership provide the foundational 
understanding of DoD’s views on leadership development, as well as an understanding of 
the DSCA mission. Additionally, an overview of the evolution of leadership theory informs 
where leadership has been. These foundational backdrops comprise the knowledge 
baseline from which to begin a discourse on the evolution of DSCA-specific leadership 
development. Case studies of what has worked and not worked are used to build on this 
foundation. Finally, recommendations are made for appropriate policies to improve the 
JQS’s DSCA leadership development.  
The topic of DoD leadership attracts disparate participants, who nonetheless are 
focused similarly on successful mission accomplishment. The National Defense 
University, the director of the National Guard Bureau, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff (CJCS), and governors are all key stakeholders. Yet Congress has the power to 
override them all and mandate change as it did with the GNA. A major objective (when it 
comes to the audience) is to navigate the balance of writing for military readers who are 
well versed in the DSCA mission as well as politicians who may have a lesser working 
knowledge of the DSCA mission. Understanding that CJCS can approve JQS adjustments 
and that Congress can mandate them helps to frame recommendations that result from the 
research.  
Another challenge in suggesting improvements to DSCA leadership development 
is to find ways that satisfy joint officer policy requirements for professional military 
education yet retain flexibility. Having the flexibility to take advantage of unique 
opportunities and challenges is essential to agility and relevant content. By leveraging 
opportunities and challenges, the DoD can learn broad lessons across various disciplines. 
The thesis highlights possible solutions; however, the goal is to reveal the need for DSCA-
focused leadership development, not a specific program or approach.  
 4 
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Because leadership, experience, education, JQS, and DSCA are all topics that 
provide ample opportunities to meander, two research questions serve to focus the scope 
and intent. The first part of this thesis attempts to address the following question: What are 
the leadership qualities required of officers working in domestic interagency 
environments? Another part offers potential solutions to the following question: How 
should the Joint Qualification System, as used by the DoD, be modified for officers 
working in DSCA and true interagency environments? Narrowing the scope to these two 
questions provides the compass to steer research, discourse, case-study selection, and 
solution suggestions. Answering the leadership qualities question provides the data needed 
to then suggest solutions for the modification question. 
 
 5 
II. EVOLUTION OF LEADERSHIP THEORY 
The greatest enemy of learning is knowing. 
 —John Maxwell 
A. BACKGROUND: DOCTRINE 
While knowing doctrine and procedures can set the foundation for understanding 
and give the practitioner a valuable head start, much of the DSCA mission, as with any 
mission, involves learning techniques and localisms. Doctrinal sources for DSCA include 
acts of Congress, DoD instructions, DoD manuals, joint publications (JPs), secretary of 
defense strategic documents, combatant command concept plans, service-level 
instructions, and policies established by the joint institutions themselves. The most 
important act of Congress applicable to DSCA is the Posse Comitatus Act, passed in 1878, 
which restricts the government’s use of federal military forces in domestic law enforcement 
issues.6 Notably, the restrictions enumerated in this act do not apply to National Guard 
state militias. The most important act of Congress applicable to JPME/JQS is the 
Goldwater–Nichols Act of 1986, which was followed shortly thereafter by the Skelton 
Report in 1989.7 Together, these two documents represent the single most extensive 
overhaul of the DoD and the creation of the joint-matters concept. The concept is all about 
combining JPME with joint experience. At the instruction level, DoD Instruction 3025.22 
speaks to the National Guard’s role in DSCA.8 At the operational level, DoD Manual 
3025.01 spells out learning points from the past as well as current operational-level DSCA 
policy and is the foundation for subordinate publications.9 Three joint publications form 
 
6 Posse Comitatus Act, Public Law 45-263, U.S. Statutes at Large 20 (1878):152, http://legisworks. 
org/congress/45/session-2/chap-263.pdf. 
7 Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, Public Law 99-433, U.S. 
Statutes at Large 100 (1986): 992–1075, https://www.gpoo.gov/fdsys/pkg/STATUTE-100/pdf/STATUTE-
100-Pg992.pdf; and Report of the Panel on Military Education, House of Representatives, 101st Cong., 1st 
sess. (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1989). 
8 Department of Defense, The Use of the National Guard for Defense Support of Civil Authorities, 
DoD Instruction 3025.22 (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2013). 
9 Department of Defense, Defense Support of Civil Authorities: Overview, DoD Manual 3025.01, vol. 1 
(Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2016). 
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the foundation for DSCA: JP 3-28 is about the armed forces and DSCA; JP 3-41 details 
chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear response; and JP 3-08 reveals policy for 
interagency coordination including with foreign governments and civilian authorities.10 
These primary sources of DSCA doctrine will give the reader who is unfamiliar with DSCA 
a foundational understanding of the structure and procedure involved in the mission.  
Opinion sources on DSCA comprise innumerable GAO reports, congressional 
studies, theses, and scholarly articles, thereby doing a cogent review beyond the scope of 
this literature review; however, this thesis draws on some of these relevant sources 
throughout the paper. Additionally, in opening the aperture to leadership theory, the 
following section broadens the scope to include a myriad of books and other sources.  
B. ANTECEDENT: VERTICAL LEADERSHIP 
Identifying leadership qualities required of officers working in DSCA 
environments and making recommendations about the evolution of JQS must necessarily 
include a review of the literature on the evolution of leadership theory. Without a review 
of leadership theory evolution, there is a risk of devolving to a solution that has previously 
proven inadequate or incomplete. Examining roads previously traveled and competing 
theories enables a genuinely informed attempt at paving new ground for the JQS.  
1. Trait Theory 
Leaders are born, not made. The hypothesis of trait theory is that successful leaders 
possess key attributes. This research has attempted to identify intellectual, psychological, 
physical, or emotional traits that can be used to select potential leaders. While some traits 
at times seem better than others, trait theory literature does not settle on any consistently 
 
10 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Defense Support of Civil Authorities, Joint Publication 3-28 (Washington, DC: 
Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2013), http://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3_28.pdf; Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Consequence Management, Joint 
Publication 3-41 (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2012); and Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
Interorganizational Coordination during Joint Operations, Joint Publication 3-08 (Washington, DC: Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, 2011). 
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clear leadership trends or traits.11 Trait theory proves to be incomplete, as it discounts the 
idea that other factors can be just as critical to leadership success. 
2. Behavior Theory 
This work focuses more on what leaders do than on the inborn attributes they 
possess.12 Researchers at Michigan State, Ohio State, and other universities have studied 
leadership behaviors and how those behaviors intersect with organizations, essentially 
attempting to craft a recipe book for leadership.13 The results of this research have given 
rise to the notion that if leadership is not an inborn trait, then it can be taught.14 Building 
on this work, Blake, Shepard, and Mouton have developed the leadership factors of concern 
for people, concern for output, and flexibility.15 While behavior theory suggests that 
leadership can be taught, it does more to categorize leadership styles than to prescribe the 
proper components to teach. Moreover, it serves to highlight the idea that leadership is 
more complex than merely being innate.  
3. Contingency Theory 
Many and varied contingency theories allege that effective leadership depends on 
the interplay of two or more variables. Fred Fiedler suggests that leadership style and 
situational favorability to that style are the magic formula.16 Path-goal theory presents the 
importance of follower motivation and a leader’s ability to satisfy it. Vroom and Yetton 
 
11 Luther Lee Bernard, An Introduction to Social Psychology (New York: Holt, 1926). 
12 A. W. Halpin and B. J. Winer, “A Factorial Study of the Leader Behavior Description,” in Leader 
Behavior: Its Description and Measurement, ed. Ralph M. Stogdill and Alvin E. Coons (Columbus: Ohio 
State University, 1957), 39-51; and Ralph Melvin Stogdill and Alvin E. Coons, eds., Leader Behavior: Its 
Description and Measurement (Columbus: Ohio State University, 1957). 
13 John K. Hemphill and Alvin E. Coons, “Development of the Leader Behavior Description 
Questionnaire,” in Leader Behavior: Its Description and Measurement, ed. Ralph M. Stogdill and Alvin E. 
Coons (Columbus: Ohio State University, 1957), 38. 
14 Frank E. Saal and Patrick A. Knight, Industrial/Organizational Psychology: Science and Practice 
(Pacific Grove, CA: Brooks/Cole Publishing, 1988). 
15 Robert Rogers Blake, Herbert A. Shepard, and Jane S. Mouton, Managing Intergroup Conflict in 
Industry (Houston: Gulf, 1964). 
16 Fred Edward Fiedler, A Theory of Leadership Effectiveness (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1967). 
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conclude that a decision tree is the solution.17 The vertical dyad linkage theory uses the in-
group/out-group framework to establish the leader-member exchange theory.18 Thus, the 
advent of various contingency theories has broadened the scope of successful leadership 
study. To this point, the literature suggests that traits and behaviors of the leader, situational 
context, and follower characteristics are all components of successful leadership. 
4. Culture Theory 
Leadership research has also broadened to include consideration of organizational 
culture.19 Leaders like Steve Jobs of Apple and Sergey Brin and Larry Page of Google are 
often credited as leading a culture that has been the source of company success. Companies 
like Apple and Google are agile largely due to leadership that inculcates an innovative 
culture into the company ethos. The innovative culture of Apple and Google makes them 
receptive to evolutionary change.20  
5. Motivation Theory 
The idea behind motivation theory is summed up by the following cliché: “If you 
take care of the people, they will take care of the mission.” Frederick Herzberg’s two-factor 
satisfaction/dissatisfaction model lists satisfaction as a motivator and hygiene factors as 
de-motivators.21 Herzberg contends that satisfaction and dissatisfaction are separate 
continua that leaders must address individually. Maslow’s hierarchy of needs proposes that 
followers must satisfy lower-order needs before they address higher-order ones.22 Clayton 
 
17 Victor H. Vroom and Philip W. Yetton, Leadership and Decision-Making (Pittsburgh: University of 
Pittsburgh Press, 1973). 
18 George Graen, “Role-Making Processes within Complex Organizations,” in Handbook of Industrial 
and Organizational Psychology (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1976). 
19 Edgar H. Schein, Organizational Culture and Leadership (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2006). 
20 Angela Baron, “Going Public with Studies on Culture Management,” People Management 1, no. 19 
(September 1995): 60. 
21 Chartered Management Institute, “Frederick Herzberg: The Hygiene Motivation Theory” (London: 
Chartered Management Institute, June 2003), https://www.managers.org.uk/~/media/Campus% 
20Resources/Frederick%20Herzberg%20-%20The%20hygiene%20motivation%20theory.ashx. 
22 Abraham H. Maslow, Toward a Psychology of Being (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2013). 
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Alderfer posits that there are only three needs: existence, relatedness, and growth.23 Henry 
Murray takes the opposite approach in suggesting there are many needs.24 Expectancy 
theory is based on expected outcomes.25 Equity theory is based on input and output.26 Goal-
setting theory assumes that followers are motivated to achieve goals set by leaders.27 
Finally, consequences are the core motivator in reinforcement theory.28 The vertical 
theories to this point have focused on the roles of leaders and followers, but a transition 
has affected those traditional roles and forced leadership theory to evolve.  
C. TRANSITION: INDUSTRIAL AGE TO INFORMATION AGE 
The work of Frederick Winslow Taylor is an example of vertical-style industrial 
age leadership. Taylor was a visionary who had an incredible global impact. In The One 
Best Way, Jeremy Rifkin says, “[Taylor] has probably had a greater effect on the private 
and public lives of the men and women of the twentieth century than any other single 
individual.”29 Peter Drucker places him ahead of Marx and on par with Darwin and Freud 
as an intellectual thinker.30 His self-described “scientific methods” were essentially 
prescriptive, vertical leadership directives aimed at squeezing every ounce of efficiency 
possible from a given process. He was known for carrying a stopwatch and clocking tasks 
to find the single best, most efficient way to complete a task. The results were undeniable. 
Efficiency gains at a pig iron plant went from 12.5 to 47 tons of steel and from 600 workers 
 
23 Clayton P. Alderfer, “An Empirical Test of a New Theory of Human Needs,” Organizational 
Behavior and Human Performance 4, no. 2 (May 1969): 142–75, https://doi.org/10.1016/0030-5073(69) 
90004-X. 
24 Henry A. Murray, Explorations in Personality (New York: Oxford University Press, 1938). 
25 Victor H. Vroom, Work and Motivation (New York: Wiley, 1964). 
26 J. S. Adams, “Inequity in Social Exchange,” in Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, vol. 2, 
ed. L. Berkowitz (New York: Academic Press, 1965), 267–299. 
27 Edwin A. Locke, “Toward a Theory of Task Motivation and Incentives,” Organizational Behavior 
and Human Performance 3, no. 2 (1968): 157–189. 
28 B. F. Skinner, Cumulative Record, definitive ed. (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1959). 
29 Robert Kanigel, The One Best Way: Frederick Winslow Taylor and the Enigma of Efficiency 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005), 8, https://books.google.com/books?id=2PgXCC5Ck_MC. 
30 Kanigel, 502–3. 
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down to only 40.31 A ball bearing factory went from 120 to 35 workers.32 Material costs at 
a paper mill were reduced from $75 to $35 per ton, and labor costs were cut from $30 to 
just eight dollars per ton for an overall 60 percent reduction in costs.33 Taylor was 
immensely successful in the industrial age, yet his leadership style may not work with 
today’s information age workforce. An excerpt from his book is a case in point:  
[A laborer] shall be so stupid and so phlegmatic that he more nearly 
resembles in his mental make-up the ox than any other type. . . . The 
workman who is best suited to handling pig iron is unable to understand the 
real science of doing this class of work. He is so stupid that the word 
“percentage” has no meaning to him, and he must consequently be trained 
by a man more intelligent than himself into the habit of working in 
accordance with the laws of this science before he can be successful.34 
The literature on leadership theory is continually evolving because the workplace 
and the worker are continually evolving. The information age puts knowledge in the hands 
of nearly anyone who desires to evolve beyond the “phlegmatic” worker that Taylor speaks 
of. Presumably, the methods to develop leadership qualities of officers working in domestic 
interagency environments should evolve, too. That is not to say that old, or even new, 
research is wrong. Valuable nuggets of wisdom can be harvested from past and present 
leadership theories. Certainly, the efficiencies of scientific management can still be applied 
today. Nevertheless, it is the vast body of work in its entirety that begins to reveal what 
may have initially been viewed as merely a complicated field is fast becoming a complex 
one.35 The past decade or so has seen a trend in leadership research that continues to build 
upon previous works to generate a more holistic approach to leadership in the new 
information age. Transactional leadership theory, which seeks to lead with the goal of task 
completion, is giving way to transformational theory.36  
 
31 Frederick Winslow Taylor, The Principles of Scientific Management (New York: Harper & Brothers, 
1913), 42, 43, Google Books. 
32 Kanigel, The One Best Way, 304. 
33 Kanigel, 260. 
34 Taylor, The Principles of Scientific Management, 59. 
35 The difference between complicated and complex are discussed more thoroughly later in this thesis. 
36 James MacGregor Burns, Leadership (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1978). 
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Transformational leadership theory, which seems to affect follower performance 
more positively, is more about motivation and organizational change.37 A meta-analysis 
comparing singular and transformational leadership reveals that the latter is a more 
effective approach for team effectiveness.38 Each of these draws from previous theories 
and builds on them to make sense of growing complexity. According to Wilson, George, 
and Wellins, “One of the greatest changes in our business world is the transformation of 
an industrial-based economy into an information-based economy.”39 This new information 
age requires speed, agility, and innovation at a pace that is accelerating. Moore’s law, 
which so far has proven to be generally true, says that transistors in a circuit will double 
every two years.40 This notion that processing speeds double every two years is often used 
as a metaphor for the notion that information, change, and life are accelerating similarly. 
For example, a Standard & Poor’s 500 company in the 1950s could expect to reign for 60 
years, but in 2017, Credit Suisse claimed that time at the top would last only for 20 years.41 
Innosight says that time at the top will be only 14 years by 2026.42 This evolution from a 
relatively static efficiency-focused industrial age to an ever-accelerating, agility-focused 
information age is, not surprisingly, affecting the evolution of leadership theory. In her 
 
37 Bernard M. Bass, Leadership and Performance beyond Expectations (New York: Free Press, 1985); 
and Timothy A. Judge and Ronald F. Piccolo, “Transformational and Transactional Leadership: A Meta-
Analytic Test of Their Relative Validity,” Journal of Applied Psychology 89, no. 5 (2004): 755–768, 
https://doi.org/10.1037/0021-9010.89.5.755. 
38 Judge and Piccolo, “Transformational and Transactional Leadership, 755–68. “The foundation of 
scientific research is based on primary studies that collect data under a given set of conditions (i.e., 
experiments or field studies) and examine effects on, or relationships among, the observed variables of 
interest. However, all research is subject to limitations and no single study is definitive. Thus, there is 
considerable value in the use of a meta-analysis to quantitatively combine multiple primary studies and 
summarize their findings.” National Research Council, Enhancing the Effectiveness of Team Science 
(Washington, DC: National Academies Press, 2015), box 3-1, https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/ 
NBK310384/. 
39 Jeanne M. Wilson, Jill George, and Richard S. Wellins, Leadership Trapeze: Strategies for 
Leadership in Team-Based Organizations (San Francisco, Jossey-Bass, 1994), 18. 
40 G. E. Moore, “Cramming More Components onto Integrated Circuits,” IEEE Solid-State Circuits 
Society Newsletter 11, no. 3 (September 2006): 33–35, https://doi.org/10.1109/N-SSC.2006.4785860. 
41 Michael J. Mauboussin, Dan Callahan, and Darius Majd, Corporate Longevity, Index Turnover and 
Corporate Performance (Zurich: Credit Suisse, February 7, 2017), https://research-doc.credit-suisse.com/ 
docView?language=ENG&format=PDF&sourceid=em&document_id=1070991801&serialid=TqtAPA%2
FTEBUW%2BgCJnJNtlkenIBO4nHiIyPL7Muuz0FI%3D. 
42 Scott D. Anthony, Patrick S. Viguerie, and Andrew Waldeck, “Corporate Longevity: Turbulence 
Ahead for Large Organizations” (executive briefing, Innosight, Spring 2016), 2, https://www.innosight. 
com/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/Corporate-Longevity-2016-Final.pdf. 
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comprehensive review of leadership theory, Melissa Horner concludes, “It is suggested 
that tomorrow’s leaders may need to hold visions, values, assumptions and paradigms that 
are in agreement with having a team-oriented, empowered workforce in order to be most 
successful.”43 This team-oriented mindset, borne of the information age, is generating a 
new area of leadership theory.  
D. SUBSEQUENT: SHARED LEADERSHIP 
Vertical industrial-age leadership literature from the past tends to focus on the two 
roles of leader and follower.44 Information-age leadership literature in the present is 
immature but trending away from those old-school top-down hierarchical approaches and 
toward flatter, more distributed, shared leadership approaches.45 These distributed team 
approaches share responsibilities and leadership roles in pursuit of common goals and seek 
to leverage the power and agility of multiple minds rather than depend on the mind and 
abilities of a single leader.46 There are branches of the shared leadership concept. Carson, 
Tesluk, and Marrone espouse an overall shared leadership theory.47 Pearce and Ensley 
embrace a shared vision model.48 Hmieleski, Cole, and Baron adopt a shared authentic 
 
43 Melissa Horner, “Leadership Theory: Past, Present and Future,” Team Performance Management: 
An International Journal 3, no. 4 (December 1997): 282, https://doi.org/10.1108/13527599710195402; and 
Charles C. Manz and Henry P. Sims Jr., “Leading Workers to Lead Themselves: The External Leadership 
of Self-Managing Work Teams,” Administrative Science Quarterly 32, no. 1 (March 1987): 106–29, 
https://doi.org/doi:10.2307/2392745. 
44 Bernard M. Bass and Ruth Bass, The Bass Handbook of Leadership: Theory, Research, and 
Managerial Applications (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2009), Google Books. 
45 David V. Day, “Leadership Development: A Review in Context,” Leadership Quarterly 11, no. 4 
(December 2000): 581–613, https://doi.org/10.1016/S1048-9843(00)00061-8; David V. Day and Michelle 
M. Harrison, “A Multilevel, Identity-Based Approach to Leadership Development,” Human Resource 
Management Review 17, no. 4 (December 2007): 360–73, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.hrmr.2007.08.007; and 
Ajay Mehra et al., “Distributed Leadership in Teams: The Network of Leadership Perceptions and Team 
Performance,” Leadership Quarterly 17, no. 3 (June 2006): 232–45, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.leaqua.2006. 
02.003. 
46 Jay B. Carson, Paul E. Tesluk, and Jennifer A. Marrone, “Shared Leadership in Teams: An 
Investigation of Antecedent Conditions and Performance,” Academy of Management Journal 50, no. 5 
(October 2007): 1217–34, https://doi.org/10.5465/amj.2007.20159921. 
47 Carson, Tesluk, and Marrone, 1217–34. 
48 Craig L. Pearce and Michael D. Ensley, “A Reciprocal and Longitudinal Investigation of the 
Innovation Process: The Central Role of Shared Vision in Product and Process Innovation Teams,” Journal 
of Organizational Behavior 25, no. 2 (2004): 259–278, https://doi.org/10.1002/job.235. 
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framework.49 Regardless of the specific shared leadership construct, the underlying 
premise follows: 
In short, more recent approaches view effective leadership as less of a top-
down, leader-centric process, and more  
of a follower-centric process through which certain understandings of 
leadership (e.g., sense making, vision, and so forth) emerge from lower 
organizational levels.50 
In “A Meta-Analysis of Shared Leadership and Team Effectiveness,” Wang, 
Waldman, and Zhang found that there is a positive relationship between shared leadership 
and team effectiveness. Among many other metrics, this one stands out: “The effects of 
shared leadership are stronger when the work of team members is complex.”51 In 2015, a 
committee from the National Academy of Sciences recognized that “team science . . . has 
led to scientific breakthroughs that would not otherwise have been possible.”52 Researchers 
and corporate giants like Boeing have come to realize that there is power in teams. As a 
result, shared leadership concepts are the latest evolution of leadership theory.  
One thing, however, remains constant in the literature: every new contribution 
builds on the foundation of literature that has come before it. As such, shared leadership 
literature is a broadening of, not a replacement for, vertical leadership theory: “Shared 
leadership is not mutually exclusive to other leadership forms and behaviors, but can be 
engaged in simultaneously with other approaches such as vertical leadership.”53 
 
49 Keith M. Hmieleski, Michael S. Cole, and Robert A. Baron, “Shared Authentic Leadership and New 
Venture Performance,” Journal of Management 38, no. 5 (2012): 1476–99, https://doi.org/10.1177/ 
0149206311415419. 
50 Danni Wang, David A. Waldman, and Zhen Zhang, “A Meta-Analysis of Shared Leadership and 
Team Effectiveness,” Journal of Applied Psychology 99, no. 2 (March 2014): 181, http://doi.org/10.1037/ 
a0034531. 
51 Wang, Waldman, and Zhang, 181. 
52 National Research Council, Enhancing the Effectiveness of Team Science, 1. 
53 Julia E. Hoch and James H. Dulebohn, “Shared Leadership in Enterprise Resource Planning and 
Human Resource Management System Implementation,” Human Resource Management Review 23, no. 1 
(March 2013): 114–25, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.hrmr.2012.06.007. 
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E. CONCLUSION 
Vertical leadership literature is extensive and, at times, contradictory. Generally 
speaking, however, an analysis of the literature reveals that successful leadership does not 
happen on its own. It usually begins with some level of personal aptitude (trait theory) but 
is further developed with experience and education about organizations, cultures, 
contingencies, and environments. It then culminates with the understanding of what 
behaviors and motivators to use in a given context by bringing together all three: aptitude, 
experience, and education.  
Shared (team) leadership literature is growing in response to a transition from the 
leader-centric industrial age to a follower-centric information age where the pace is fast, 
agility is required, and leadership is much more distributed. Aptitude, education, and 
experience are all still required for effective leadership, but the ability to apply them in a 
flatter environment is the paradigm shift. The environment of the interagency is one of 
collaboration, and the mission is bottom-up.54 A vertical top-down authoritarian approach 
is simply not possible when the mission has not yet reached the top, and someone else has 
the authority. Leaders must have shared leadership skills to be successful in the DSCA 
environment. The literature is clear. Leadership theory is evolving in parallel with a fast-
paced information age that does not wait for hierarchy. Corporations either shift to team 
leadership and agility or they die. In the DSCA mission, real people die, not corporations.  
 
 
54 DSCA missions start at the local level, then become state, and then become federal. 
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III. EVOLUTION OF THE DOWNRANGE MISSION 
In the previous chapter, a quick survey of the literature on leadership shows that in 
addition to the traditional vertical leadership qualities of the industrial age, the required 
leadership qualities are evolving to include the shared leadership qualities of the 
information age. Practitioners in this chapter tell a story of evolution as well. The 
background case studies of WWII and Operation Eagle Claw highlight functional silos and 
the problem of command, a hierarchical mentality that produced less-than-optimum results 
and is often still prevalent in the interagency. Congress eventually mandated a change to 
improve results. In looking for leadership qualities required of DSCA officers, it might be 
tempting to stop at the antecedent case study, the Gulf War. The Gulf War’s command-of-
teams construct certainly produced fantastic results, and its leaders understood the 
importance of shared leadership.55 However, just as the industrial age evolved into the 
information age, the information age is causing another evolution of the environment in 
which DSCA leaders operate. The information age has the power to transform complicated 
problems into complex ones. General A. Stanley McChrystal reveals valuable leadership 
qualities for DSCA officers in this chapter’s subsequent section, a case study on Operation 
Iraqi Freedom and McChrystal’s team-of-teams concept.  
A. BACKGROUND: SILOS AND COMMAND 
The general who advances without coveting fame and retreats without 
fearing disgrace, whose only thought is to protect his country and do good 
service for his sovereign, is the jewel of the kingdom. 
 —Sun Tzu56 
 
55 Although the concept is discussed in more detail later, the command of teams during the Gulf War 
was framed by GNA and the joint-matters philosophy whereby service rivalry was replaced with a 
coordinated effort and shared leadership across the coalition. The coalition leadership commanded services 
in a way that was synchronized and synergistic.  
56 Sunzi, Sun Tzu, and Wu Sun, The Art of War, trans. Samuel B. Griffith (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1971), 128. 
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1. Command: World War II 
General MacArthur and Admiral Nimitz were not the jewels of the kingdom, as 
highlighted by Jason B. Barlow in “Interservice Rivalry in the Pacific.” Barlow paints a 
picture of ego and service rivalry taking precedence over sound military judgment in the 
Pacific Theater. MacArthur was the ranking general and war hero.57 On the other hand, the 
Navy was accustomed to treating the Pacific as its own “special preserve,” and was 
adamantly against MacArthur as Supreme Commander.58 After five weeks of gridlock, the 
Joint Chiefs finally decided to divide the Pacific Theater, with MacArthur in charge of the 
Southwest Pacific and Nimitz in charge of the rest of the Pacific.59 Unity of command, it 
seemed, would take a back seat to politics and ego. MacArthur was incredulous: 
Of all the faulty decisions of the war . . . perhaps the most unexplainable 
one was the failure to unify the command in the Pacific. The principle 
involved is perhaps the most fundamental one in the doctrine and tradition 
of command. . . . The failure to do so in the Pacific cannot be defended in 
logic, in theory, or even in common sense. Other motives must be ascribed. 
It resulted in divided effort, and the consequent extension of the war with 
added casualties and cost.60 
Despite his adamant view that command should be unified, MacArthur did not  
yield for the greater good. He coveted fame, and he feared disgrace. Similarly, Nimitz  
and his Navy, despite being inferior in rank, refused to yield a traditionally Navy-run 
Pacific to MacArthur. The Joint Chiefs, as evidenced by taking five weeks to decide 
nothing—by leaving two commands in place—were an extension of service rivalry. The 
Joint Chiefs did not embrace “jointness,” and unity of effort was at the mercy of service 
silos (see Figure 1). 
 
57 Ronald H. Spector, Eagle against the Sun: The American War with Japan (New York: Simon and 
Schuster, 2012), 144, Google Books. 
58 Jason B. Barlow, “Interservice Rivalry in the Pacific,” Joint Forces Quarterly (Spring 1994): 77, 
http://www.dtic.mil/docs/citations/ADA528913. 
59 John Costello, The Pacific War: 1941–1945 (New York: Harper Collins, 1982), 225, Google Books. 
60 Louis Morton, The War in the Pacific: Strategy and Command: The First Two Years, United States 




Figure 1. Silos and Command61 
2. Command: Operation Eagle Claw 
Operation Eagle Claw was another example of DoD service silos, and the results 
were disastrous. The services had not trained together, the helicopter pilots had not been 
adequately trained for the low-altitude ingress tactics, the weather forecast had not 
addressed the infamous haboob sandstorm phenomenon, and the services had met for the 
first time in the desert in Iran.62 Colonel James Kyle, who was the senior commander at 
the Desert One landing zone in Iran, would recall that there were “four commanders at the 
scene without visible identification, incompatible radios, and no agreed-upon plan, not 
even a designated location for the commander.”63 In short, only 75 percent of the 
helicopters made it to the rendezvous point, after which one broke down. At that point, the 
mission was aborted, and one of the departing helicopters collided with a C-130, killing 
eight and leaving gear and secret documents behind.64 Yet again, unity of effort was at the 
mercy of service silos. 
  
 
61 Source: Stanley McChrystal et al., Team of Teams: New Rules of Engagement for a Complex World 
(New York: Penguin, 2015), loc. 2371 of 6029, Kindle. 
62 Locher, “Has It Worked?” 5. 
63 Locher, 100. 
64 Locher, 100. 
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The House and Senate each began hearings in response to the Operation Eagle Claw 
(OEC) failure. Additionally, the DoD’s Special Operations Review Group, otherwise 
known as the Holloway Commission, began its review.65 Aside from technical and service 
training issues, the commission identified one fundamental strategic shortcoming: “The ad 
hoc nature of the organization and planning [was] related to most of the major issues and 
underl[ay] the group’s conclusions.”66 Interservice rivalry had been the Achilles heel of 
the DoD for decades, but OEC was the final straw. The Holloway Report became the 
catalyst that eventually led to the Goldwater–Nichols Act of 1986, which then led to the 
JQS, breaking down silos and setting the scene for the Gulf War. 
B. ANTECEDENT: THE GULF WAR AND COMMAND OF TEAMS 
1. Congressional Mandate: The Goldwater–Nichols Act 
There is a broad consensus that a change was needed to fix service silos, and there 
is general agreement that the GNA was the remedy. Jones and Adolph, Stile, and Hitt say 
that the GNA did not go far enough.67 Conversely, Luttwak says that the GNA went too 
far.68 The debate over whether the GNA worked, went too far, or did not go far enough, 
while interesting, is irrelevant to the scope of this thesis. Nevertheless, it is well within its 
scope to highlight DoD leadership opinions on what the GNA and the JQS attempted to 
accomplish. Martin Dempsey, the former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (October 
2011 September 2015), is perhaps the most vocal champion of the post-GNA joint 
leadership renaissance.69 General Dempsey is not alone in his belief in the primacy of joint 
 
65 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Iran Hostage Rescue Mission Report (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
August 1980), 60, https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu//NSAEBB/NSAEBB63/doc8.pdf. 
66 Joint Chiefs of Staff, 60. 
67 R. Jones, “Goldwater-Nichols Act Take II: The Need for Legislative Change in the Interagency” 
(Norfolk, VA: Joint Forces Staff College), 3–5; and Robert B. Adolph Jr., Charles W. Stiles, and Franklin 
D. Hitt Jr., “Why Goldwater-Nichols Didn’t Go Far Enough” Joint Forces Quarterly (Spring 1995), 
http://www.dtic.mil/docs/citations/ADA528916. 
68 Edward N. Luttwak, “Washington’s Biggest Scandal,” Commentary 97, no. 5 (May 1994): 29–33; 
and Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigation, Another Crossroads? 
Professional Military Education Two Decades after the Goldwater-Nichols Act and the Skelton Panel, 
Committee Print 111-4 (Washington, DC: House of Representatives, April 2010), https://eric.ed.gov/?id= 
ED509594. 
69 “About,” Joint Chiefs of Staff, accessed November 4, 2018, http://www.jcs.mil/About/The-Joint-
Staff/Chairman/. 
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leadership development. This view is evident in strategic guidance documents and 
directives of senior leaders. In his strategic guidance, Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta 
discusses a “smaller and leaner” DoD and goes on to describe the path toward the joint 
force of 2020: “The DoD will manage the force in ways that protect its ability to regenerate 
capabilities that might be needed to meet future, unforeseen demands, maintaining 
intellectual capital and rank structure that could be called upon to expand key elements of 
the force.”70 General Dempsey also defines joint leadership as the foundation of the 
profession.71 Former CJCS Admiral Mike Mullen (October 2007–September 2011) 
presents joint force leadership as the first of three key themes in his National Military 
Strategy: “[Joint] Leadership is how we exercise the full spectrum of power to defend our 
national interests and advance international security and stability.”72 Admiral Mullen also 
describes full-spectrum leadership approaches that include the roles of facilitator, enabler, 
convener, and guarantor, which directly correlate with the DSCA mission.73 Not 
surprisingly, national military leaders are unanimous in their support of joint leadership 
development. The GNA was the watershed event that gave birth to the new joint paradigm, 
and the department has had over 30 years to mature and adjust to the GNA mandate. Joint 
matters are continually evolving, and joint leadership development within the JQS should 
also evolve, especially given the increased emphasis on DSCA missions and increasing 
reliance on the reserve component as an operational force.  
2. The Joint Qualification System 
Before the GNA, a joint billet was the kiss of death for a military officer and was 
seen as the fast track to separation or retirement. Given the extent of turf protection, silos, 
and inter-service rivalries of the time, this was not an unexpected revelation. As the GNA 
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73 Joint Chiefs of Staff, The National Military Strategy of the United States of America, 2011: 
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supplanted the prior construct, however, the old generation of military was replaced by the 
new one. Consequently, the old-school silo mindset has slowly evolved into one that values 
joint matters. The JQS is the system that approves joint-matters leadership development 
and creates joint qualified officers (JQOs). There are two requirements for becoming a 
JQO. The first requirement is JPME. The second requirement is to experience a full tour 
of duty in a joint assignment. This tour can be satisfied by either the standard path (S-JDA) 
selected from the joint duty assignment list or the experience path (E-JDA; see Figure 2). 
The bottom line is that a JQO is created by combining education with training and 
experience.74 Over the years, the list of institutions approved to teach JPME has evolved. 
Most recently, the intelligence-centric course taught at the National Intelligence University 
and the international-centric course taught at the College of International Security affairs 
were added to the education piece of JQS. Additionally, the E-JDA was added to the 
experience side of the JQS (see Figure 2). The goal of the GNA and JQS mandate was to 
develop joint leaders who could succeed where WWII and OEC did not. The Gulf War 
would provide the proving ground. 
 
74 See Appendix A for the JQS Primer, which explains the JQS in more detail.  
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Figure 2. JQS Leader Development Framework75 
 
75 Source: Joint Chiefs of Staff, Officer Professional Military Education Policy, Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff Instruction 1800.01E (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, May 29, 2015), http://www. 
jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Library/Instructions/1800_01a.pdf?ver=2016-02-05-175009-547. 
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3. Command of Teams: The Gulf War 
The Gulf War’s Operation Desert Storm is the holy grail for GNA and JQS 
advocates. Operation Desert Storm was a mechanistic marvel that Taylor, Goldwater, 
Nichols, and the Holloway Commission would be proud of. It was the pinnacle of 
efficiency and jointness. Resolution 678 of the United Nations gave Saddam Hussein until 
January 15, 1991, to withdraw from Kuwait or risk being forced out.76 On January 17, 
1991, the coalition forces began prepping the battlefield by launching a 39-day bombing 
campaign. The ground assault commenced on February 24, 1991, and although Iraq had 
one of the largest armies in the world, it was concluded 100 hours later.77 In An Operational 
Analysis of the Persian Gulf War, Colonel Douglass W. Craft presents two of the most 
critical contributors to success. The first was “an intellectual renaissance and the 
development of a professional education system for officers and NCO’s.”78 The second 
was the National Training Center. Both were implemented many years before Desert 
Storm. The Gulf War coalition consisted primarily of British, U.S., French, and Saudi 
forces in a dual-command authority construct. General Schwarzkopf commanded U.S. 
forces (commander in chief of Central Command) and had operational control over British 
forces while Saudi Lieutenant General Khalid bin Sultan commanded Arab forces (the 
Joint Force Theater of Operations Command) and have operational control (initially) over 
French forces.79 The dual-command structure of Schwarzkopf and Khalid could have 
easily resulted in a silo-centric operational quagmire reminiscent of MacArthur and 
Nimitz’s needless extension of WWII. Fortunately, the two Gulf War generals rejected silo 
mentality to command the various countries’ teams, and common education and training 
 
76 G.A. Res. 678, at 27 (November 29, 1990), http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/678. 
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were foundational to their shared leadership. As Craft describes, “The relationship between 
General Schwarzkopf and Lieutenant General Khalid developed as one of lead and 
support. . . . He [Khalid] was educated in U.S. military schools at Fort Leavenworth and 
Maxwell Air Force Base and this training provided a common basis of language and 
doctrine.”80 At the operational level, effective command of teams grounded in common 
education, language, and doctrine is why the Persian Gulf War was so impressive (see 
Figure 3). 
 
Figure 3. Command of Teams81 
C. TRANSITION: COMPLICATED TO COMPLEX 
It would be tempting to stop at the Gulf War when searching for leadership qualities 
that DSCA officers need to develop. After all, everything seemed to go right. Indeed, there 
are good command-of-teams lessons to take from the Gulf War; however, it was nearly 
three decades ago, and the downrange environment has evolved dramatically. The 
transition in the previous chapter identified the shift from an industrial age to an 
information age and its role in the evolution of leadership theory toward shared leadership. 
The information age has brought with it never-before-seen data volume at everyone’s 
fingertips. That knowledge is not only quickening the pace of change but also changing the 
kinds of changes. The increased awareness that big data and the information age provides 
is causing a change from complicated to complex. Henry Ford’s assembly line was 
complicated but generally linear and could be broken down into industrial-age Tayloristic, 
 
80 Craft, 23. 
81 Source: McChrystal et al., Team of Teams, loc. 2371. 
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reductionist tasks.82 Conversely, Boeing’s construction of a 787 airliner is a complex 
endeavor that comprises an expansive team of suppliers, workers, countries, and minds.83 
Accordingly, a tsunami in Asia, tariffs on steel, or sanctions on Iran could all have a ripple 
effect in such a complex network of interdependencies.  
Complicated and complex are often used as synonyms, but there are important 
differences. In WWII, cracking the code for Japanese hierarchical transmissions was a 
complicated effort involving the construction of a replica of the Japanese coding machine 
known as the “Purple Machine.”84 Knowing that the Japanese changed the cipher every 
three months further complicated the effort. That said, when something is complicated, it 
is generally linear and predictable. Even though being complicated may involve many 
parts, each is connected in simple, linear succession. McChrystal et al. explain complicated 
as follows: 
The workings of a complicated device like an internal combustion engine 
might be confusing, but they ultimately can be broken down into a series of 
neat and tidy deterministic relationships; by the end, you will be able to 
predict with relative certainty what will happen when one part of the device 
is activated or altered.85 
Complex, on the other hand, is generally unpredictable due to the vast number of 
interconnections. Tracking the transmissions of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) 
involved a distributed network of transmissions using a virtual private network and  
 
82 Taylorism emphasizes maximum efficiency to the extent of timed reductionist task cards. Taylor, 
The Principles of Scientific Management. 
83 Dominic Gates, “Boeing 787: Parts from Around World Will Be Swiftly Integrated,” Seattle Times, 
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84 Erik J. Dahl, Intelligence and Surprise Attack: Failure and Success from Pearl Harbor to 9/11 and 
Beyond (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2013), loc. 758, Kindle. 
85 McChrystal et al., Team of Teams, loc. 1068. 
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The Onion Router to access the Dark Web to send anonymous messages via Telegram.86 
Sure, intercepting ISIS transmissions is difficult, but the information age also provides big 
data. It is often assumed that big data can sift through all the complexity and find the 
answer, but it cannot. Big data alone cannot offset the challenge of complexity. The story 
of Tarek al-Tyeb Mohamed Bouszizi is an example of how the information age is turning 
what might have been a locally complicated fruit vendor’s protest in the town square into 
something as internationally complex as the Arab Spring:  
When he [Tarek al-Tayeb Mohamed Bouazizi] douses himself with 
gasoline and self-immolates, events spiral out of control at breakneck speed: 
A crowd protests his death, and his cousin records the scene on his iPhone. 
Videos appear on YouTube within two days, along with a picture of Tarek, 
aflame and dying. More protests erupt. Videos of those protests wind up on 
Facebook. Arabs everywhere see their Tunisian brethren in the streets. Not 
only Al Jazeera, but The New York Times and The Guardian make trips to 
the small town of Sidi Bouzid. Within three months, the thirty-year reign of 
Hosni Mubarak is brought to an end some 1,400 miles away in Cairo, 
Muammar Gaddafi starts losing control of Libya after four decades in 
power, and Syria begins its descent into intractable civil war. Despite having 
more data about Arab societies—and about individuals like Tarek—than at 
any time in history, no government, search engine, or social media platform 
foresaw Tarek’s self-immolation or the impact it would have.87 
There is no Tayloristic task card, no doctrinal source, no Watson computer, and no 
big-data processing capability that could have predicted a fruit vendor named Tarek in 
Tunisia would set off a chain reaction of human events like the Arab Spring. The 
information age is turning complicated problems into complex ones, and leaders must be 
developed not only to recognize it but also to counter it. Complex means that shared 
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leadership skills and commanding teams, the skills that made Schwarzkopf and Khalid 
more efficient than MacArthur and Nimitz, are no longer enough (see Figure 4). 
 
Figure 4. Complicated versus Complex88 
Fast forward to Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). General Stanley McChrystal 
learned through experience that complexity required the Gulf War skills of shared 
leadership and command of teams to be taken to the next level. The evolution from  
the industrial age to the information age, which in turn has created an evolution  
from complicated to complex, necessarily requires leaders and leadership-development 
programs to evolve. General McChrystal agrees and critiques the early part of OIF:  
“In Iraq, we were using complicated solutions to attack a complex problem.”89 He goes on 
to say, “We have moved from data-poor but fairly predictable settings to data-rich, 
uncertain ones.”90 
 
88 Source: McChrystal et al., loc. 1090. 
89 McChrystal et al., loc. 1301. 
90 McChrystal et al., loc. 1355. 
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D. SUBSEQUENT: OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM AND COMMANDING 
A TEAM OF TEAMS 
The Gulf War was a complicated problem to solve in a data-poor, predictable 
setting. OIF was a complex problem to solve in a data-rich, uncertain one. While General 
McChrystal had a supremely efficient GNA- and JQS-enabled DoD at his disposal during 
OIF, just as General Schwarzkopf had during the Gulf War, the two generals faced vastly 
different adversaries. Schwarzkopf faced a complicated force-on-force tactical problem 
while McChrystal faced a complex counterinsurgency tactical problem. Consider the fact 
that the Gulf War occurred in 1991, and “the internet was mainstream among researchers 
by 1989, among Silicon Valley movers and shakers by mid-1995, and by most US 
households by 2001.”91 Consider also that while mobile phone technology existed, it was 
in its infancy. In 1992, the Motorola International 3200 was a state-of-the-art mobile phone 
and classified as “very small” at brick-size with a six-inch antennae.92 It weighed in at over 
one pound and boasted 30–60 minutes of talk time on a five-hour charge. Conversely, 
during OIF, the internet was mainstream, and the smallest cell phones could take pictures, 
access the internet, and fit in a pocket. Technology accelerating at the pace of Moore’s law 
turned an environment that was geographically the same from complicated to complex. 
Leaders of the future will need to accept, even embrace, the pace of change and uncertainty 
that Moore’s law and complexity bring, and they will need to develop new ways to deal 
with it. 
McChrystal came to realize that the efficiency machine that was the DoD, while 
formidable and the most advanced fighting force on the planet, was not in itself adequate 
to deal with the complex threat that he faced. The DoD was efficient to be sure, but it was 
also mired in processes and procedures that often impeded flexibility and resilience. His 
solution was to pivot away from efficiency in favor of adaptability, trust, and transparency 
(see Figure 5):  
 
91 Shane Greenstein, How the Internet Became Commercial: Innovation, Privatization, and the Birth of 
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The solution we devised was a “team of teams”—an organization within 
which the relationships between constituent teams resembled those between 
individuals on a single team: teams that had traditionally resided in separate 
silos would now have to become fused to one another via trust and 
purpose.93  
 
Figure 5. Commanding a Team of Teams94 
1. Adaptability 
McChrystal’s Task Force was continually frustrated by the enemy’s ability to 
outplay them. Despite having command of teams and an understanding of shared 
leadership, and despite having the most advanced technology and weaponry, the Task 
Force found that the enemy could adapt faster than it could. Policies, procedures, distrust, 
silos, and information sharing were all barriers to Task Force adaptability. In hindsight, all 
of the information, intelligence, equipment, and expertise were available to thwart the 
enemy’s operation, but often they came together too late. The complex environment of the 
enemy was moving at information-age speeds. McChrystal’s leadership challenge was in 
finding a way for his Task Force to move at information-age speeds, too. He needed a more 
adaptable Task Force. The enemy was adaptable, and McChrystal knew of adaptable teams 
in his organization. Navy Sea Air and Land (SEAL) Team Six is the premier adaptability 
organization. Whether rescuing Captain Philips from a dinghy at sea or abducting a high-
value target like Osama Bin Laden in Abbottabad, Pakistan, SEAL Team Six is extensively 
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trained and well versed in the unpredictable and complex. The Basic Underwater 
Demolition/SEAL (BUD/S) training course is a particularly grueling endeavor that not only 
educates and trains its graduates for the unpredictable and complex but also binds its 
graduates with a level of trust that is equal to or greater than a shared familial bloodline. 
For McChrystal, the team-of-teams revelation was not in the existence of adaptable, 
flexible, resilient teams like SEAL Team Six; trust and transparency were the two 
components that made small teams adaptable. The wicked problem for McChrystal was 
how to replicate the small team dynamic throughout his giant task force so that it could 
adapt at information-age speeds. His solution, a team of teams, is a template even for the 
gargantuan interagency force of the DSCA mission. Moreover, the leadership qualities that 
McChrystal’s officers needed to develop—shared leadership, adaptability, trust, 
embedding, and transparency—are the same leadership qualities that DSCA officers need 
to develop. The leadership qualities are the same; there are just different names for the silos 
that have to be overcome.  
2. Trust 
Building a Task Force team of teams would require trust, and embedding was how 
the task force created that trust. Just as the shared experience of BUD/S builds the 
foundation of trust for Navy SEALs, so too did the embedding program in Iraq build a 
foundation of trust for the Task Force. The idea was controversial at first because the best 
and brightest proven battlefield superstars were chosen for liaison officer (LNO) positions 
in places far from the battlefield like embassies and agency operations centers. As time 
passed, however, the task force began to realize that “by building personal relationships, 
[it] could build between teams some of the fluency that traditionally exists within 
teams. . . . And their feelings of trust and understanding would expand to the other unit, 
even if they’d only really gotten to know a single operator.”95 McChrystal writes, “We 
became LNO fanatics.”96  
 
95 McChrystal et al., loc. 3182, 3201. 
96 McChrystal et al., loc. 3219. 
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One key point to re-emphasize is that the embedding program was successful 
because the Task Force chose LNOs who were the best possible representatives from their 
organizations because these LNOs would personify the host agency’s or organization’s 
impression of the Task Force. If the task force sent a dimwit to be an LNO, then the host 
would view the Task Force as a force of dimwits. McChrystal and his leadership team 
understood that while it was painful to send the best and brightest, it was the only way to 
build a team of teams based on trust: “When asking for LNO nominations to fill critical 
positions, we used two criteria: (1) if it doesn’t pain you to give the person up, pick 
someone else; (2) if it’s not someone whose voice you’ll recognize when they call you at 
home at 2:00 a.m., pick someone else.”97  
Make no mistake, the level of trust created by the task-force embedding program 
and the level of trust created by the BUD/S program are not the same. Trust within a team 
of deeply connected members will always be stronger than the trust forged by liaison-level 
connection. Fortunately for the task force, the liaison-level connection built enough trust 
to enable transparency and information sharing to establish a “shared consciousness” 
throughout the task force.  
3. Shared Consciousness: Transparency and Information Sharing 
While the goal of the embedding program was to build trust in pursuit of 
adaptability, McChrystal discovered another valuable tool to kick-start the cycle. That tool 
was the daily operations and intelligence (O&I) briefing. McChrystal took a decidedly 
different approach to the O&I briefing. Instead of the old “need to know” paradigm, he let 
the entire enterprise look behind the curtain. In his quest for “shared consciousness,” 
McChrystal strived to share everything possible with the widest possible audience. 
Successes, failures, wicked problems, innovative solutions—everything was on the table. 
The Task Force and its partners would need to overcome cultural barriers and the silo 
mindset if transparency had a chance. The Task Force would have to take the first leap of 
faith, and the O&I briefing was the mechanism. In time, the example set by the O&I 
briefing’s transparency began to breed buy-in from other stakeholders, and a systemic 
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understanding began to emerge to complement the lateral connectivity that the embedding 
program provided: “Together, these two cornerstones—systemic understanding and strong 
lateral connectivity—grounded shared consciousness.”98 The story that A Team of Teams 
tells regarding intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets highlights the 
importance of shared consciousness. The technological advances that ISR provided were 
invaluable to ground commanders in theater. The ability to continuously watch the enemy 
in full-motion video provided opportunities never before seen. Accordingly, commanders 
were loath to give up the capability, and when the assets were taken from them, it caused 
“internal convulsions in the task force.” In time, however, shared consciousness began to 
have the intended effect: 
Before, these decisions took place behind closed doors. Now, the resourcing 
conversations sometimes occurred right in front of them during an O&I. 
“When we started constantly talking at lower levels of the organization,” 
explains an enlisted SEAL who worked with the Task Force in Iraq, “we 
could basically see where the fight was hot, where it wasn’t, and where 
people needed ISR the most. Plus, we could see that it was actually to our 
benefit sometimes to surrender that asset.” With that awareness came a faith 
that when theirs was the priority mission, they would get what they needed 
when they needed it.99 
E. CONCLUSION 
The downrange mission has evolved tremendously over the years. WWII and 
Operation Eagle Claw were examples of service rivalry, silos, and command. A change 
was needed. When the DoD could not act, Congress rightly did. While the GNA and JQS 
fuel debate to this day, there is no disputing that the Gulf War was a marvel of military 
execution. On those grounds, evolving to the GNA and JQS had the desired effect. Moving 
to jointness and the command of teams resulted in mission success. Even so, the battlespace 
is an ever-changing environment. General Schwarzkopf (Gulf War) and General 
McChrystal (OIF) faced the same geography but radically different environments. The 
information age (and a different mission objective) changed Schwarzkopf’s complicated 
environment into McChrystal’s complex one. Success in this new complex environment 
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required not only the DoD’s industrial-age efficiency but also a command evolution to a 
team of teams whereby jointness was taken to the next level via the trust and shared 
consciousness that embedding and transparency provides.  
Regardless of whether they come from top-down mandate or self-awareness, 
lessons from the downrange mission can and must be applied to the homeland mission. 
While the GNA was successful top-down legislation that evolved the downrange mission 
from command to the command of teams, a similar piece of homeland legislation might 
have less utility in the legally bottom-up homeland mission. For the homeland mission, the 
objective of the top-down component should be modeled after McChrystal’s authority in 
changing paradigms and challenging outdated processes and assumptions to enable a 
bottom-up team of teams.  
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IV. EVOLUTION OF THE HOMELAND MISSION 
Chapter II presented the leadership qualities required through the lens of academia. 
The industrial age has given way to the information age, and leadership theory has evolved 
from vertical leadership qualities toward shared leadership qualities. Chapter III presented 
leadership qualities required of officers through the lens of downrange practitioners and 
case studies. Downrange leadership has evolved from the silos and command of WWII and 
Operation Eagle Claw to the command of teams of the Gulf War to commanding a team of 
teams in OIF. The information age has turned the complicated into the complex; therefore, 
downrange officers require qualities such as adaptability, trust, and shared consciousness 
to leverage the entire enterprise.  
This chapter presents the leadership qualities required of DSCA officers through 
the lens of homeland DSCA practitioners and case studies. Homeland DSCA leadership 
has evolved from the silos and command of Hurricane Katrina to the command of teams 
of Superstorm Sandy but has yet to fully evolve into commanding a team of teams as in 
the downrange mission. To evolve into commanding a team of teams, the DSCA mission 
must leverage and develop the same critical adaptability, agility, trust, and shared 
consciousness components that the downrange mission did.  
A. BACKGROUND: DSCA AND THE LAW 
Evolving the DSCA mission from commanding teams to commanding a team of 
teams is not as simple as copying the downrange task force template. It requires an 
understanding of distinct legal differences that differentiate the Homeland DSCA mission. 
The United States of America was framed by founding fathers with a common distrust of 
standing armies.100 Thomas Jefferson, who wrote the first draft of the Declaration of 
Independence and later became the nation’s third president, argued strongly for state’s 
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rights.101 Moreover, Article X of the U.S. Constitution reads, “The powers not delegated 
to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to 
the States, respectively, or to the people.”102 Additionally, James Madison, one of the 
principal authors of the Constitution, was a proponent of state militias and authored the 
Second Amendment.103 It reads as follows: “A well-regulated Militia, being necessary to 
the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be 
infringed.”104 It is against this backdrop that the laws relating to the DSCA mission were 
written. DSCA officers must be mindful that while the DSCA environment has many 
parallels to the downrange environment, there are distinctions shaped by legislation.  
1. The Posse Comitatus Act of 1878 
The most prevalent and often cited DSCA legislation is the Posse Comitatus Act. 
This act has a significant effect on the DSCA mission because it restricts the use of federal 
military personnel in response to domestic law enforcement issues.105  
Whoever, except in cases and under circumstances expressly authorized by 
the Constitution or Act of Congress, willfully uses any part of the Army or 
the Air Force as a posse Comitatus or otherwise to execute the laws shall be 
fined under this title or imprisoned not more than two years, or both.106 
Some key exceptions to the Posse Comitatus Act are National Guard militias in Title 32 
status, the Coast Guard (assistance from the Navy is acceptable), aerial search and 
surveillance, operations in the “war on drugs,” and troops in a federal status who can be 
used to suppress domestic violence.107 
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2. The Insurrection Act 
The Insurrection Act is a prime example of the nation’s aversion to using a standing 
army in the homeland, but situations like rebellion warrant the use of federal-status troops 
to suppress domestic violence. The president may use his authority or respond to a state’s 
request. The act is a compilation of statutes enacted over several years: 
(1) The Calling Forth Act: 10 U.S.C. § 334 (1792) 
The Calling Forth Act gave President Washington the authority to call on the militia 
and was later used in the Whiskey Rebellion of 1793.  
(2) 10 U.S.C. § 331 (1795) (1807) 
The Calling Forth Act was strengthened in 1795 with the addition of the provision 
for governor or state legislature requests to the president for assistance. In 1807, 
President Thomas Jefferson requested the ability to use not only the militia but the 
standing army as well.  
(3) 10 U.S.C. § 332 (1861) 
Enacted on the request of President Abraham Lincoln in anticipation of the Civil 
War, it allows the president to use federal forces on his authority rather than wait 
for a request from the state.  
(4) 10 U.S.C. § 333 (1869) 
It was used by President Grant to deal with the Ku Klux Klan in the aftermath of 
the Civil War. 
In summary, the Insurrection Act says that the president can use federal forces for 
law enforcement on his authority without a request from the state.108 Considering today’s 
political environment, however, and the nation’s historical aversion to using a standing 
army in the domestic environment, the president is unlikely, except in grave circumstances, 
to act without a request from the state. Such a request relieves the president of defending 
his assessment of “insurrection” as justification for pressing the limits of Article X of the 
Constitution and the Posse Comitatus Act. 
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3. The Stafford Act (1988) 
The Stafford Act is a culmination of disaster relief legislation, and the name is often 
used generically as a surrogate when the federal government provides disaster relief 
because state and local capacities are exceeded. In 1950, the Federal Disaster Relief 
Program was passed to supplement state and local capacity, but it authorized assistance 
only in response to disasters. The year 1979 saw the creation of the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency whereby statutory authorities were consolidated into one agency.109 
In 1988, the Stafford Act was passed.110 It is the mechanism that allows the federal 
government, including the DoD, to get involved when tribal, local, and state capacity is 
exceeded. This involvement entails the governor formally requesting assistance, thereby 
certifying his capacity has been exhausted, and federal assistance is needed, which is then 
followed by an emergency declaration by the president. In 1996, the Disaster Relief Act 
expanded the authority of the Federal Disaster Relief Program to include recovery as well 
as disaster response. See the Domestic Operational Law Handbook for further discussion, 
detail, and nuance of the Stafford Act.111  
4. The Economy Act 
The Economy Act provides a mechanism for government entities to purchase goods 
and services from other government entities. For DSCA, this essentially means that the 
DoD should be reimbursed for goods and services rendered.112 Commanders should not, 
however, withhold assistance that would “save lives, prevent human suffering, or mitigate 
great property damage” under their immediate response authority simply because the cost 
or ability to reimburse is in question.113 
 
109 In 2002, the Federal Emergency Management Agency was placed under the newly created 
Department of Homeland Security. Since then, both have applied the Stafford Act. 
110 Stafford Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, Public Law 93-288, U.S. Statutes at Large 102 
(1987) 4689, codified 42 U.S.C. § 5121 et seq., https://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/1519395888776-
af5f95a1a9237302af7e3fd5b0d07d71/StaffordAct.pdf. 
111 John Rawcliffe and Jeannine Smith, eds., Operational Law Handbook (Charlottesville, VA: Judge 
Advocate General’s Legal Center and School, August 2006), https://fas.org/irp/doddir/army/law0806.pdf. 
112 “Lesson 1: Military Response and Integration of Military Support,” Federal Emergency 
Management Agency, accessed July 16, 2017, https://emilms.fema.gov/is75/MREM0101summary.htm. 
113 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Defense Support of Civil Authorities.  
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The overarching theme throughout all of the DSCA legislation is that DSCA is a 
mission that does not rise to the federal level until state and local capacity has been 
exceeded. Even then, federal military forces are used only in the event that other federal 
capacities either do not exist or are exceeded. DSCA officers must be well versed in the 
legal distinctions between the homeland mission and the downrange mission. The 
downrange mission, although formally structured hierarchically, has evolved to 
commanding a team of teams. A case study comparison of Hurricane Katrina and 
Superstorm Sandy highlights how the DSCA mission has evolved in parallel to the 
downrange mission.  
B. APPLES TO APPLES: HURRICANE KATRINA VERSUS  
SUPERSTORM SANDY 
Comparing the two storms, it could be argued, is invalid because Katrina was a 
hurricane and Sandy was a post-tropical cyclone informally called a “superstorm” by the 
media. Yet, in terms of destruction and cost, Katrina and Sandy are near peers (see Figure 
6). Furthermore, as told in a Daily Mail headline, “Sandy WAS more powerful than 
Hurricane Katrina—and it ranks as the second mightiest storm in modern history” (original 
emphasis).114 This article and others refer to the comparative Integrated Kinetic Energy 
Index (IKE) of each storm.115 Hurricane Sandy’s IKE of 140 Terajoules exceeded Katrina’s 
by 20 Terajoules.116 The point here is that, despite the semantic labels of hurricane and 
superstorm, the two storms were relative peers in terms of strength and physical 
destruction. Leaders in both scenarios faced a similar order of magnitude, but there is no 
question that Katrina was vastly more destructive in terms of human cost. Valid leadership 
failures and successes, as well as leadership qualities required of DSCA officers, can be 
gleaned from the two-storm case study. 
 
114 “Sandy Was More Powerful Than Hurricane Katrina—and It Ranks as the Second Mightiest Storm 
in Modern History,” Daily Mail, November 3, 2012, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/worldnews/article-
2227487/Hurricane-Sandy-Storm-WAS-powerful-Hurricane-Katrina.html. 
115 Andrew Freedman, “Scientists Develop New Way of Classifying Hurricanes,” Climate Central, 
May 7, 2013, http://www.climatecentral.org/news/scientists-propose-new-way-of-classifying-hurricanes-
15956; and V. Misra, S. DiNapoli, and M. Powell, “The Track Integrated Kinetic Energy of Atlantic 
Tropical Cyclones,” Monthly Weather Review 141, no. 7 (2013): 2383–9. 
116 “Sandy Was More Powerful Than Hurricane Katrina.”  
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Figure 6. University of North Carolina Hurricane Infographic117 
 
117 Source: Adam Levenson, “Decade of Destruction: The High Cost of Hurricanes [Infographic],” 
University of North Carolina, September 30, 2014, https://onlinempa.unc.edu/decade-destruction-high-
cost-hurricanes-infographic/. 
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C. HURRICANE KATRINA: MORE SILOS AND COMMAND 
1. Lack of Trust 
If the two storms were relatively similar in terms of destructive power, why then 
was Katrina a human disaster and Sandy a human triumph? One of the answers is eerily 
similar to the silo days of MacArthur and Nimitz wherein distrust, and a refusal to give up 
authority for the greater good, negatively affected the mission.  
Nagin [the mayor of New Orleans] suggested that Lt. Gen. Russel Honore, 
the Pentagon’s on-scene commander, be put in charge. According to 
Senator Vitter, Bush turned to Governor Blanco and said, “Well, what do 
you think of that, Governor?” Blanco told Bush, “I’d rather talk to you about 
that privately.” To which Nagin responded, “Well, why don’t you do that 
now?” The meeting broke up. Bush and Blanco disappeared to talk. More 
than a week later, there was still no agreement. Blanco didn’t want to give 
up her authority, and Bush didn’t press.118  
Unity of effort is not a controversial concept until the point of deciding who will be 
in charge. That is where the distrust, silos, rivalries, and turf wars contribute to failure. The 
lessons of WWII, Operation Eagle Claw, and Hurricane Katrina are all examples of the 
need to choose a leader in the interest of unity of effort. Choosing a leader to unify the 
mission is no easy task and is not as simple as someone who is “born with it” (see the 
discussion on trait theory in Chapter II of this thesis). The chosen leader needs the 
education and experience required for the crisis at hand. Presumably, Bush, Blanco, and 
Nagin were all born with some level of personal aptitude. It is next to impossible to reach 
their leadership levels without it. However, no leader can know everything, especially in a 
complex world that moves at information-age speeds. The information age practically 
guarantees that all of us know more than one of us. The closed-door conversation between 
Governor Blanco and President Bush highlights the distrust and silo mindset of the time—
a mindset that certainly hindered the unity of effort that shared consciousness can facilitate. 
 
118 Evan Thomas, “The Government Response to Katrina: A Disaster within a Disaster,” Newsweek, 
September 18, 2005, http://www.newsweek.com/government-response-katrina-disaster-within-disaster-
118257.  
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2. Lack of Awareness (Shared Consciousness)  
In addition to Governor Blanco’s reluctance to give up authority, the governor’s 
apparent lack of military awareness was the second most glaring reason for hurricane 
Katrina’s DSCA leadership failure. As described by Evan Thomas for Newsweek, “Blanco 
did not specifically ask for a massive intervention by the active-duty military. ‘She 
wouldn’t know the 82nd Airborne from the Harlem Boys’ Choir,’ said an official in the 
governor's office, who did not wish to be identified talking about his boss’s conversations 
with the president.”119 Governor Blanco apparently did not have the awareness needed to 
unify the National Guard and active component troops, nor did she unify the overall effort 
by giving up her authority. Hers was an environment of silos and command. Fast forward 
seven years later, and the state governors who served in affected states that were struck by 
Superstorm Sandy had the advantage of the dual-status commander (DSC) construct, which 
evolved the DSCA mission to the command of teams.120 
D. ANTECEDENT: SUPERSTORM SANDY AND COMMAND OF TEAMS 
Superstorm Sandy was a success because DSCA evolved from silos and command 
to the command of teams. A lack of awareness during Katrina was structurally fixed in 
Superstorm Sandy by the DSC construct. The DSC served not only to unify command of 
teams but also to synchronize the unity of effort to bring additional capacity to bear. The 
silos and lack of trust during Katrina were remedied in Superstorm Sandy by the strong 
relationships of trust between the adjutant general (TAG), DSC, and their governors.  
1. DSCA and the Dual-Status Commander 
The DSC concept was that there should be a mechanism in place to allow for one 
person to command both federal Title 10 and state Title 32 teams to affect unity of effort 
 
119 Thomas. 
120 Under 32 U.S.C. § 325(a)(2), a National Guard dual-status commander “provides limited authority 
for a National Guard officer to serve simultaneously in both state and Federal statuses. The dual-status 
commander can concurrently command both Federal (Title 10) and state (Title 32, State Active Duty) 
forces. This dual status requires the authority of the President (currently delegated to the SECDEF) and the 
consent of the officer’s Governor to serve in both duty statuses.” David H. Lee, ed., Operational Law 
Handbook (Charlottesville, VA: Judge Advocate General’s Legal Center and School, 2015), 207, 
http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/operational-law-handbook_2015.pdf.  
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in the DSCA environment. The DSC is a bottom-up construct that made all the difference 
between the results of Katrina and those of Sandy.121 As DoD News reported, “Navy Adm. 
James A. ‘Sandy’ Winnefeld Jr., vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, created the 
concept while he served as NORTHCOM commander (May 2010–August 2011), and has 
called the DSC concept one of his proudest accomplishments.”122  
2. Governor’s Trust: The Key to Commanding DSCA Teams 
Although Superstorm Sandy was more powerful than Hurricane Katrina, affected 
twice as many states, and caused almost three times as many power outages, there were 93 
percent fewer deaths (see Figure 6). DSCA leadership succeeded during Hurricane Sandy 
because of the trust that DSCs had from their governors, the secretary of defense, and the 
combatant commander. DoD News captured this dynamic: “As Sandy was whirling its way 
toward the U.S. coastline in late October, Defense Secretary Leon E. Panetta responded to 
requests by several state governors in its anticipated path by appointing dual-status 
commanders in New Jersey, New Hampshire, New York, Maryland and Rhode Island.”123 
The response to Super-storm Sandy reaffirmed the value of a new command structure that 
Army General Charles H. Jacoby Jr., commander of the U.S. Northern Command, called 
“one of the most important initiatives to improve defense support of civilian authorities in 
more than a decade.”124 
The fact that the DSCs were requested before Sandy arrived is evidence of the 
evolution of the governor and TAG relationship in each state. This relationship built on 
trust cannot be overstated. In the event state civilian capacity is exceeded, the governor can 
activate his militia to state active duty (SAD), thereby providing additional capacity and 
potentially avoiding a request for federal assistance. By law, states are required to exhaust 
 
121 “Dual-Status, Single Purpose: A Unified Military Response to Hurricane,” Air National Guard, 
accessed August 27, 2018, http://www.ang.af.mil/Media/Article-Display/Article/435355/dual-status-single-
purpose-a-unified-military-response-to-hurricane-sandy/. 
122 Donna Miles, “Sandy Response Reaffirms Value of Dual-Status Commanders,” Department of 
Defense News, January 11, 2013, http://archive.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=118975. Admiral 




their resources/capacity before requesting federal assistance.125 Not only is it a requirement 
of law, but it is also a practical requirement of politics. On the one hand, governors are 
expected to care for their constituents. As described by the National Guard, 
A crew from the Colorado National Guard was there for its neighbors 
Thursday, when the four Soldiers evacuated residents trapped by high water 
and debris following flooding in the Beulah area. No injuries were reported 
in the flood. The Soldiers responded after a verbal executive order from 
Gov. John Hickenlooper.126 
Success stories like these bolster a governor’s standing with constituents. They also serve 
as a small-scale unity-of-effort proving ground and build trust within the interagency in the 
state. As long as SAD can handle the event, there is political value to the governor in being 
seen as commander in chief of the state militia.  
On the other hand, constituents will not understand if a governor is slow in asking 
for—or never recognizes the need to ask for—federal help when her capacity to care for 
them has been exceeded, as was the case following Hurricane Katrina. Events that do not 
meet the threshold for a presidential federal Title 10 DSCA activation, but do meet the 
threshold for SAD, serve to strengthen the trust not only between TAG and the governor 
but also between the citizen-soldier and the general public. In fact, the public trust that 
SAD missions generate can even affect elections. The New York Times alluded to this effect 
in discussing the 2014 gubernatorial election in Colorado: “Voters ratified a governor who 
had led the state through floods, fires, and a mass shooting inside a movie theater.”127  
 
125 Richard J. Hayes Jr. “DOD Response under the Stafford Act: A Call to Action,” Joint Force 
Quarterly 77, no. 2 (2015): 84–90, http://ndupress.ndu.edu/Media/News/Article/581880/dod-response-
under-the-stafford-act-a-call-to-action/; and “Overview of Stafford Act to Support States,” Federal 
Emergency Management Agency, accessed June 30, 2017, https://www.fema.gov/pdf/emergency/nrf/nrf-
stafford.pdf.  
126 “Colorado National Guard Flies Flood Victims to Safety,” National Guard, accessed July 1, 2017, 
http://www.nationalguard.mil/News/tabid/3336/Article/1180898/colorado-national-guard-flies-flood-
victims-to-safety.aspx.  
127 Jack Healy, “As Other Democrats Fall, Colorado Governor Goes from Angst to Relief,” New York 
Times, November 5, 2014, https://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/06/us/john-hickenlooper-wins-second-term-
as-colorado-governor.html?auth=login-email&login=email. See also “Governor Hickenlooper Executive 
Orders,” Colorado State Archives, accessed August 27, 2019, https://www.colorado.gov/pacific/archives/ 
governor-hickenlooper-executive-orders#eo2014.  
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It would be tempting to stop at Superstorm Sandy when searching for leadership 
qualities that DSCA officers need to develop. After all, the nightmare that was Katrina 
seemed to have been fixed. Governors trusted their DSCs, and DSCs provided unity of 
command and unity of effort to access additionally needed capacities. Indeed, there are 
good command-of-teams lessons to take from Superstorm Sandy; however, the information 
age and complexity continue to change the environment. Just as the downrange mission 
needed to evolve from the Gulf War—commanding teams—in favor of Operation Iraqi 
Freedom—commanding a team of teams—so, too, must the homeland mission evolve from 
the commanding of teams during Superstorm Sandy to commanding a team of teams in the 
DSCA future.  
E. SUBSEQUENT: DSCA’S BOTTOM-UP EVOLUTION TOWARD 
COMMANDING A TEAM OF TEAMS 
So far, this thesis has highlighted antecedent, transitional, and subsequent case 
study evolution. However, for the homeland mission, there is no “subsequent” case study 
for DSCA because the transition is incomplete. Complexity has set in motion the 
evolutionary transition from rigid, top-down, hierarchical mandates toward adaptive, agile, 
bottom-up solutions based on trust and shared consciousness. Evolving the homeland 
mission further to commanding a team of teams will require the same concepts that the 
Task Force used to evolve the downrange mission from the Gulf War—the command of 
teams—to Operation Iraqi Freedom—commanding a team of teams. Notably, however, 
there is a distinction between the downrange mission and the homeland mission. The 
homeland mission is legally structured as a bottom-up mission while the downrange 
mission has a top-down, hierarchical structure.  
Curiously though, the downrange mission was the first to recognize the value of 
bottom-up flatter organizational execution in the form of a team of teams. In the book of 
the same name, McChrystal et al. define the version of bottom-up adaptability, 
“empowered execution.” Corporate America has recognized the value of a bottom-up team 
of teams in the Lean movement.128 Finally, the DSCA mission, too, albeit belatedly, 
 
128 The Lean movement is described later in this chapter. 
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implemented downrange lessons by moving to a bottom-up approach with the DSC 
construct, which evolved the DSCA mission from Katrina’s silos and command to Sandy’s 
commanding of teams. The concepts required of DSCA leadership to connect small teams 
in a way that enables commanding a team of teams at the enterprise level are bottom-up 
adaptability and agility, trust, and shared consciousness.  
1. Adaptability and Agility: Harnessing the Power of Small Teams 
The transition section in Chapter III focused on the transition from complicated to 
complex. Fighting complexity for the Task Force meant becoming adaptable. Similar 
complexities exist in the homeland DSCA environment when dealing with terrorist 
adversaries. Mother nature, too, can be an unpredictable adversary for the DSCA 
community. Moreover, the homeland environment can be just as complex as the overseas 
environment when multiple agencies, jurisdictions, and civil liberties are considered.  
This chapter’s “transition” focuses on leveraging from the bottom up, which is how 
McChrystal’s Task Force was able to learn to adapt quickly. As McChrystal et al. describe, 
“The connectivity of trust and purpose imbues teams with an ability to solve problems that 
could never be foreseen by a single manager—their solutions often emerge as the bottom-
up result of interactions, rather than from top-down orders.”129 A report from the Center 
for a New American Security also supports the bottom-up notion: “To the extent that 
intensive intelligence analysis pays dividends against IEDs [improvised explosive 
devices], it appears to occur when analysts are closest to where the problem is—at the 
ground level.”130 General Martin Dempsey agrees: “The best information, the most 
important intelligence, and the context that provides the best understanding come from the 
bottom up, not from the top down.”131 McChrystal says, “Small teams are effective in large 
part because they are small—people know each other intimately and have clocked 
 
129 McChrystal et al., Team of Teams, loc. 2126. 
130 Michael T. Flynn, Matt Pottinger, and Paul D. Batchelor, Fixing Intel: A Blueprint for Making 
Intelligence Relevant in Afghanistan (Washington, DC: Center for a New American Security, January 
2010), 22. 
131 Martin E. Dempsey, “Our Army’s Campaign of Learning” (remarks at the Association of the U.S. 
Army’s Chapter Presidents’ Dinner, Washington, DC, October 4, 2009), 4, https://www.ausa.org/sites/ 
default/files/LPE-09-3-Our-Armys-Campaign-of-Learning.pdf.  
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hundreds of hours with each other.”132 He goes on to highlight the fact that current 
technologies, such as the real-time, full-motion video provided by ISR, while great for 
shared consciousness, also create the temptation to micro-manage in a top-down fashion. 
McChrystal’s idea of empowered execution recognizes that speed depends on low-level 
execution, armed with as much higher-level awareness as possible: 
While shared consciousness had helped us overcome the interdependence 
of the environment, speed, the second ingredient of complexity, still posed 
a challenge. Effective adaptation to emerging threats and opportunities 
requires the disciplined practice of empowered execution. Individuals and 
teams closest to the problem, armed with unprecedented levels of insights 
from across the network, offer the best ability to decide and act 
decisively.133 
General McChrystal found that the transition to commanding a team of teams required the 
bottom-up adaptability of empowered execution.  
a. Agile Development 
There is a similar bottom-up concept to General McChrystal’s empowered 
execution interpretation of adaptability in private-sector software development, called agile 
development. Eric Ries provides the basic idea behind agile development in his book The 
Lean Startup: How Today’s Entrepreneurs Use Continuous Innovation to Create Radically 
Successful Businesses. In it, Ries describes how, despite seemingly violating all of the 
traditional methodologies, he was able to build a successful $50 million company with 
more than 100 employees: 
  
 
132 McChrystal et al., Team of Teams, 2321. 
133 McChrystal et al., loc. 3979. 
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We do everything wrong: instead of spending years perfecting our 
technology, we build a minimum viable product, an early product that is 
terrible, full of bugs and crash-your-computer-yes-really stability problems. 
Then we ship it to customers way before it’s ready. And we charge money 
for it. After securing initial customers, we change the product constantly—
much too fast by traditional standards—shipping new versions of our 
product dozens of times every single day.134 
Ries had found that the early adopters, the ones who value being on the cutting edge 
more than receiving a perfect product, were critical to product development and the 
elimination of waste. In many cases, early adopters revealed that the company’s conceived 
program features would have involved countless, unnecessary hours of complicated code 
writing. On the other hand, he found that some early-adopter feature requests, which were 
simple to code but had not been envisioned by his team, were wildly popular. The early 
adopters began to see themselves as a critical and necessary part of the development team. 
Ries began to discover that small-batch bottom-up development was more agile and 
responsive to product success. He had tried before and failed with seemingly great business 
plans: “We were building a way for college kids to create online profiles for the purpose 
of sharing . . . with employers. Oops.”135 But this time, he was a success. The transition to 
bottom-up has made all the difference in the complex world of software development that 
moves at Moore’s law pace.  
b. Lean Manufacturing 
The manufacturing world is also migrating to a bottom-up concept—similar to 
General McChrystal’s empowered execution and software developer Eric Reis’s agile 
development—called Lean manufacturing. Toyota Motor Corporation has made Lean 
manufacturing commonplace. Taiichi Ohno, inventor of the Toyota production system and 
Lean manufacturing says, “Look for and eliminate waste.”136 The Andon cord is a big part 
of the small batches and waste-elimination concept that the Toyota production system 
 
134 Eric Ries, The Lean Startup: How Today’s Entrepreneurs Use Continuous Innovation to Create 
Radically Successful Businesses (New York: Crown Publishing Group, 2011), 4, Kindle. 
135 Ries, 1–2. 
136 Taiichi Ohno, Toyota Production System: Beyond Large-Scale Production (Boca Raton, FL: CRC 
Press, 1988), x. 
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embodies. The Andon cord empowers workers to call for help or even stop the production 
line if a problem is noticed: “The paradoxical Toyota proverb, ‘Stop production so that 
production never has to stop’” means that fixing small problems now eliminates big 
problems later.137 While workers have the Andon cord, leaders rely on genchi gembutsu, 
which means “get out of the office and see for yourself.”138 Both the Andon cord and 
genchi gembutsu are bottom-up tools that manufacturing uses to combat complexity.  
c. The Lean Startup 
The military uses empowered execution, software developers use agile 
development, and manufacturing uses Lean production. All are bottom-up tools to combat 
complexity in the information age. Entrepreneurship is also migrating to the bottom-up 
approach. Steve Blank is the pioneer of a customer-development process of 
entrepreneurship. A core component of that concept is also to get out of the office and 
listen to the customer.139 Steve Blank and Eric Ries, together, are the champions of a 
concept called the Lean startup, which combines an initial set of hypotheses (what would 
traditionally be called a business plan), agile development, and genchi gembutsu.140 The 
Lean startup sermon preaches a build, measure, learn methodology. Start with hypotheses. 
Build a small-batch, minimum viable product solution, much like the early adopter beta 
tests in agile development, and measure the response. Then get out of the office to learn 
what it means.  
Armed with data from the field, a decision to either pivot and start the cycle again 
or persevere and start the cycle again can be made.141 The entire cycle is predicated on 
bottom-up agility and asking the right questions early to prevent waste and find truly what 
 
137 Ries, The Lean Startup, 227. 
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the customer needs. John E. Kelly III, International Business Machines’ senior vice 
president for cognitive solutions and research, says, “In the twenty-first century, knowing 
all the answers won’t distinguish someone’s intelligence—rather, the ability to ask all the 
right questions will be the mark of true genius.”142 Complexity and the information age 
practically guarantee that future DSCA leaders will not know all the answers. “Why?” is 
often the right question to ask. National Guardsmen have been known to ask why when  
the top-down, hierarchical, bureaucratic, overpriced, slow-moving answer seems to make 
little sense.  
d. National Guard: The Power of Small Teams 
The downrange military, software developers, manufacturing, and entrepreneurs 
have all recognized that bottom-up adaptability and agility are the way to combat the 
complexity of the information age. Fortunately for the DSCA mission, National Guard 
militias throughout the nation already form a network of small bottom-up teams that have 
demonstrated agility, innovation, and adaptation. Many National Guard leaders are 
effective at thinking outside the box because they “live” outside the box in their full-time 
civilian jobs. Proficiency in both civilian and military disciplines enables these citizen-
soldier leaders to reason beyond the groupthink mentality of Department of Homeland 
Security stovepipes and DoD silos. For example, when fiscal constraints forced the Air 
Force to decide not to fund National Guard fighter jets for targeting pods that would have 
enabled them to guide smart laser weapons to the target, the Air National Guard was agile 
in the political process by securing congressional funding via the National Guard and 
Reserve Equipment Appropriations process.143 The National Guard’s agility generated this 
funding to buy advanced targeting pods (ATPs), which enabled the operational relevance 
of Air Guard fighter jets.144 
 
142 Ries, The Lean Startup, 227. 
143 “National Guard and Reserve Equipment Appropriation (NGREA),” Defense Acquisition 
University, accessed August 27, 2019, https://www.dau.edu/acquipedia/pages/articledetails.aspx#!544.  
144 Mark Faram, “Equipping the Guard for the 21st Century,” National Guard Magazine, accessed 
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The hierarchically structured, top-down DoD should recognize the National 
Guard’s agility as a valuable tool in facilitating mission accomplishment. A mission-
focused mentality would realize that the total force is better because of the National 
Guard’s unique agility and innovation. The top-down bureaucratic solution was an 
expensive low altitude navigation and targeting infrared for night (LANTIRN) pod system 
procured only for active-component fighter jets. The bottom-up National Guard solution 
became the Litening and Sniper ATPs. Now used by active- and reserve-component fighter 
jets alike, these less expensive, more capable targeting systems have replaced LANTIRN 
as well as expanded to bomber aircraft. Bottom-up National Guard adaptation and agility 
produced a better solution than the top-down DoD bureaucracy.  
Politicians would also be well served to recognize the power of small-team, bottom-
up, National Guard agility. Defense-spending watchdogs should welcome the National 
Guard’s agility and innovation, which find cheaper and more capable systems than the 
traditional defense procurement enterprise. McChrystal, Reis, Ohno, and Blank have all 
learned the power of leveraging small teams. Likewise, DSCA leadership development 
should leverage the small agile teams that are the National Guard’s militias. Lieutenant 
General Joseph L. Lengyel once asked General Mattis about the tension sometimes created 
by the different lenses of the active and reserve components.145 According to Lengyel, 
Mattis gave him this advice: “It doesn’t matter what component you are in or what your 
job is. The only lens that ever matters is the lens of the national defense and national 
security of the United States.”146 
2. Public Trust: The Key to Commanding a DSCA Team of Teams 
As discussed earlier, the silos and command of Hurricane Katrina evolved into the 
command of teams during Superstorm Sandy in large part due to the trust between 
 
145 At the time, Lieutenant General Lengyel was working for General Mattis, the commander of U.S. 
Central Command, as a defense attaché in Egypt and had just been selected to be vice chief of the National 
Guard Bureau. General Lengyel is now the chief of the National Guard Bureau, and Mattis is the former 
secretary of defense (January 2017–January 2019).  
146 “A Conversation with Gen. Joseph L. Lengyel, Chief of the National Guard Bureau,” National 
Guard Magazine, September 2018, 28, http://www.nationalguardmagazine.com/publication/?i=520662# 
{%22issue_id%22:520662,%22page%22:0}. 
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governors and their TAGs and DSCs. In order for the evolution to continue to the next level 
of commanding a team of teams, the DSCA mission needs the kind of trust that General 
McChrystal was able to generate with his O&I briefings and his embedding program. 
Fortunately for the DSCA mission, National Guard militias throughout the nation already 
form a network of small bottom-up teams that have demonstrated the ability to build the 
same kind of trust that the Task Force did. For example, in 2017, the governor of Colorado 
activated his state militia seven times. Four were for wildfires, one was for an interagency 
Emergency Management Assistance Compact to assist the Hurricane Harvey recovery, one 
was for force protection, and one was for manning related to a mass-population influx to 
view the solar eclipse. Events like these are what create a team of teams between National 
Guardsmen, first responders, politicians, and civilians not only in the course of one year 
but also throughout the many events that span the career of a guardsman. These kinds of 
relationships build interagency trust, public confidence, and a National Guard network that 
is analogous to the Task Force’s team of teams. In some cases, a guardsman’s trust within 
the interagency is based on stressful life events, creating a trust that runs as deep as familial 
bloodlines; in others, it is less profound and more like that of an embedded LNO as part of 
a network of shared consciousness. In any case, one of the key mechanisms to transform 
the DSCA mission from commanding teams to commanding a team of teams is to leverage 
National Guard relationships that are based on years of shared events and genuine trust.  
3. Shared Consciousness: Unique National Guard Teams 
Not only do shared events create the trust that is critical in establishing a team of 
teams, but they also act as a real-world interagency proving ground—the foundation of 
connectivity, the shared consciousness of the National Guard network. A National Guard 
DSC is likely to have first-responder numbers in his cell phone long before a crisis ever 
starts and may even know those first responders by name or through a shared event from 
the past. Evolving the DSCA mission toward a bottom-up team of teams must not involve 
discourse on who should command the teams, nor must it involve discourse on how to 
create the network of small teams and connectivity. Both already exist. DSCA leadership 
development simply needs to leverage the National Guard network.  
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a. Uniquely Connected: The National Guard Network 
There is certainly transferrable expertise between defense operations overseas and 
DSCA operations in the homeland. A National Guard unit working flood relief with the 
Red Cross within its state will undoubtedly apply that knowledge to tsunami relief work 
with the Red Cross in Asia. Likewise, the intricacies of working with various tribal and 
ethnic factions overseas will have many parallels to working with urban and metropolitan 
districts within a state. Though knowledge and experience are somewhat transferable, 
relationships are not.  
In the homeland, tribal leaders, county teams, state government, non-governmental 
organizations, and National Guardsmen have typically been working together long before 
a Title 10 active-component member’s arrival and will be working together long after the 
active-component service member leaves in two to three years for his normal rotation. 
Accordingly, their relationship is one that spans years of direct and indirect interaction. 
The relationship between a governor and his or her adjutant general is the obvious example, 
but that top-level leadership development must be expanded to lower small-team levels. 
While generals, governors, and members of Congress choose courses of action, it is the 
action officers, deputy department directors, and staffers who develop the courses of action 
(COAs) from which they choose. Whereas the commander or politician is in that seat for 
only a limited time, quite often the COA developers are more entrenched. A guardsman 
may be a constituent in the same state for 10, 20, or more years. Department leaders and 
senior staffers are often deeply rooted as well. Therefore, introductions at the lieutenant 
colonel, deputy director, and senior staff levels can progress over the years to a relationship 
of trust at the general, governor, and congressman levels. A Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA) regional director’s relationship to a DSC may have begun 
years ago as part of a reconstruction team in a state emergency such as a flood, wildfire, or 
hurricane. A wing commander’s relationship to an influential businessman may have begun 
in a city council meeting just outside the base as a lieutenant and an activist. Relationships 
built in local meetings, regional disasters, and local, state, and federal politics are critical 
to DSCA success. While active-component forces are not incapable of building these types 
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of relationships, their nomadic nature makes it more difficult to maintain the kind of 
network established with genuine trust through the National Guard.  
b. Uniquely Accessible  
National Guardsmen are readily available. In fact, the Immediate Response 
Authority (IRA) mentioned earlier is just that. Troops, active or guard, can immediately 
mobilize in response to save lives, prevent human suffering, or mitigate great property 
damage.147 Beyond IRA, the governor can activate his state militia on a vocal order if need 
be. SAD activations are the most expeditious because members live within the 
communities experiencing an event, and the governor can be accessed relatively easily to 
issue a vocal order (VOCO) to SAD. Beyond IRA, the president of the United States can 
also activate his DoD service members to Title 10 DSCA if need be; however, the 
challenges of the federal bureaucracy and presidential access tend to require more effort 
and significantly more time than a simple SAD VOCO activation.  
c. Uniquely Inexpensive 
In January 2013, the Reserve Forces Advisory Board, an independent advisory 
board to the secretary of defense, conducted a study that concluded a National Guard 
member costs about one-third that of his active-duty counterpart.148 A Reserve Forces 
Policy Board report in 2014 supports the reserve component’s long-held belief that it is 
more cost-effective than its active-duty counterparts, even when mobilized.149  
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148 Reserve Forces Policy Board, Eliminating Major Gaps in DoD Data on the Fully-Burdened and 
Life-Cycle Cost of Military Personnel: Cost Elements Should Be Mandated by Policy, RFPB Report FY13-
02 (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, January 7, 2013), https://rfpb.defense.gov/Portals/67/ 
Documents/RFPB_Cost_Methodology_Final_Report_7Jan13.pdf. 
149 Reserve Forces Policy Board, Reserve Component Use, Balance, Cost and Savings: A Response to 
Questions from the Secretary of Defense, RFPB Report FY14-02 (Washington, DC: Department of 




The homeland mission has evolved in parallel with the downrange mission, from 
silos and command to the command of teams. During WWII and OEC, inter-agency silos 
and mistrust led to unnecessary loss of life and extended the war. During hurricane Katrina, 
a lack of trust and awareness resulted in the human disaster of 1,833 lives lost. In evolving 
to the command of teams, both the downrange mission in the form of the GNA/JQS and 
the homeland mission in the form of DSCs benefitted from a new structure that served to 
break down silos and foster unity of effort. As a result, both the Gulf War and Superstorm 
Sandy were deemed a success. Because of the success of the command of teams, it would 
be tempting to stop there to define the required leadership qualities of DSCA officers. That 
may be fine if the environment stopped evolving, but it will not. The information age put 
knowledge at the fingertips of everyone and, in so doing, has changed complicated 
environments into complex ones. General McChrystal’s Task Force realized that 
adaptability was the key to fighting in a complex era, and bottom-up was the way to do it. 
As a result, the downrange mission has evolved to commanding a team of teams. The 
homeland mission, however, is still behind.  
While the homeland DSCA mission does have some legal differences, the concepts 
that worked to evolve the downrange mission to commanding a team of teams will be the 
same concepts needed to evolve the homeland mission to commanding a team of teams. 
The first concept needed to evolve DSCA is adaptability and agility. The military and 
corporate America have learned the value of leveraging adaptability and agility from the 
bottom up to conquer the complex. Fail small, fail early, and pivot or persevere. Small 
teams like the SEALs and National Guard units by nature of their size and established 
relationships are the model for adaptability and agility. The second concept needed to 
evolve DSCA is trust. Replicating the trust that enables small-team adaptability and agility 
will require embedding and interaction between teams. Embedding and common 
experiences enable teams to understand other teams as well as build trust and shared 
consciousness. A quote from McChrystal is worth repeating here: 
  
 54 
While shared consciousness had helped us overcome the interdependence 
of the environment, speed, the second ingredient of complexity, still posed 
a challenge. Effective adaptation to emerging threats and opportunities 
requires the disciplined practice of empowered execution. Individuals  
and teams closest to the problem, armed with unprecedented levels of 
insights from across the network, offer the best ability to decide and act 
decisively.150 
Fortunately, the homeland DSCA mission already has a unique National Guard 
network of deeply rooted relationships that connect the small teams of the state interagency 
and allow for speedy adaptability. Additionally, the unique National Guard network 
provides the shared consciousness that helps overcome interdependency challenges. The 
homeland DSCA mission has all of the tools available to evolve from commanding teams 
to commanding a team of teams. Doing so will evolve the homeland DSCA mission from 
a whole-of-DoD to a whole-of-government approach. DSCA-focused JQS will be the spark 
that ignites and formalizes the evolution process. 
 
150 McChrystal et al., Team of Teams, loc. 3979. 
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
Two questions served to frame and focus the research and case study selection for 
this thesis. Answers to the first question—What are the leadership qualities required of 
officers working in domestic interagency environments?—are provided in the following 
conclusions section. Answers to the second question—How should the Joint Qualification 
System, as used by the DoD, be modified for officers working in DSCA and true 
interagency environments?—are provided in the following recommendations sections. 
A. CONCLUSIONS: LEADERSHIP QUALITIES REQUIRED OF DSCA 
OFFICERS 
1. Information Age: Shared Leadership 
In Chapter II, research from academia showed how the industrial age is giving way 
to the information age, and with it, leadership qualities required of DSCA leaders are 
changing. That is not to say the efficiency-based leadership qualities of the industrial age 
are obsolete. Vertical leadership, trait, behavior, contingency, culture, and motivational 
theories all still apply, but in the information age, nearly everyone can have nearly all the 
data, nearly instantly. That is especially true of the DSCA mission, which is not hamstrung 
by data classification restrictions. Information-age leadership literature is yet immature  
but trending away from top-down, hierarchical approaches and toward flatter, more 
distributed, shared leadership approaches.151 These distributed team approaches share 
responsibilities and leadership roles in pursuit of common goals and seek to leverage the 
power and agility of multiple minds rather than depend on the mind and abilities of a single 
leader.152 Among many other metrics, one that stands out is that “the effects of shared 
leadership are stronger when the work of team members is complex.”153 The idea that all 
of us will invariably know more than one of us is beginning to shift the focus away from 
the “hero” leader. Shared leadership skills are the emergent requirement for DSCA officers. 
 
151 Day, “Leadership Development, 581–613; Day and Harrison, “A Multilevel, Identity-Based 
Approach,” 360–73; and Mehra et al., “Distributed Leadership in Teams,” 232–45. 
152 Carson, Tesluk, and Marrone, “Shared Leadership in Teams,” 1217–34. 
153 Wang, Waldman, and Zhang, “A Meta-Analysis of Shared Leadership,” 181. 
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There is no better place to learn and hone shared leadership skills than the DSCA 
environment, where authorities are dispersed among jurisdictions and subject-matter 
experts are spread throughout complex disciplines, domains, and demographics.  
2. Complex: Adaptability/Agility and Shared Consciousness 
The quickening pace of change and the increasing availability of information mean 
that yesterday’s known complicated battlespace is today’s complex unknown battlespace. 
General Stanley McChrystal identified adaptability as the key to confronting complexity 
by harnessing the power of small teams. For McChrystal, such power extends the trust 
inherent in the small team to the larger enterprise by creating a “shared consciousness” via 
information-sharing and embedding liaisons in partner organizations.  
In the private sector, the word agility is used rather than the military’s preferred 
adaptability. While semantically different, the idea is similar. The private sector identifies 
agility as the key to confronting complexity by harnessing the power of small batches. For 
the private sector, harnessing the power of small batches means failing small and failing 
early. Computer programmers do it with agile development and beta tests. Small batches 
allow for small failures and early pivots and are the source of agility. The term Lean is a 
critical component of the Lean startup cycle of building (a minimum viable product), 
measuring, and learning. Learning means getting out of the office and seeing for oneself 
(genchi gembutsu), not unlike McChrystal’s embedding program. Establishing a team-of-
teams environment, which includes adaptability/agility, and shared consciousness is a 
critical requirement of DSCA officers.  
3. Bottom-Up: Trust and Relationships 
A relationship is worth a thousand processes. Possibly, the single most important 
leadership quality required of DSCA officers working in domestic interagency 
environments is the trust borne of relationships. There is an inherent professional trust 
among peers across agencies, but inter-service/inter-agency silos and turf protection are 
also a source of distrust. Trust based on relationships is far stronger than professional trust 
among peers across agencies. National Guardsmen are citizen-soldiers who live within 
their communities for years—and, sometimes, an entire career. They are teachers, 
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policemen, firefighters, politicians, business leaders, and administrators from every 
discipline, domain, and demographic. National Guardsmen have a network that is woefully 
under-leveraged by the JQS.  
B. JQS RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. Fix the Glaring Gap 
In October 2013, The U.S. Government Accountability Office issued a report to 
Congress on joint professional military education (JPME). In the report titled Actions 
Needed to Implement DoD Recommendations for Enhancing Leadership Development, the 
GAO detailed the following: “The MECC [Military Education Coordination Council] . . . 
conducted a gap analysis to identify and crosswalk the desired leader attributes for Joint 
Force 2020 with the current officer and enlisted personnel JPME education 
continuums.”154 The report highlighted gaps in the JPME curricula for meeting desired 
leader attributes. More specifically, the report highlighted areas directly related to the 
DSCA mission: 
The MECC found that the 2010 HASC [House Armed Services Committee] 
report, for example, provided a detailed assessment of the state of JPME, 
and concluded that while the overall PME system was basically sound, 
some areas needed improvement, such as an increased emphasis on joint, 
interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational operations.155 
2. Necessary Investment 
Incredibly, even though Hurricane Katrina happened 60 years after WWII and 
25 years after Operation Eagle Claw, similar systemic issues prevailed. Especially 
frustrating is the fact that while General McChrystal was learning team-of-teams lessons 
far to the right on the evolutionary continuum from 2003 to 2008 during OIF, the 
interagency was repeating silo failures far to the left on the evolutionary continuum in 
2005 during Katrina. To illustrate, the death toll in Iraq in 2005 was 846 while the death 
 
154 Farrell, Joint Military Education, 13. 
155 Farrell, 17. 
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toll for Hurricane Katrina the same year was 1,833.156 Leadership development has a cost, 
but so does a lack of leadership development. Thankfully, the death toll for Superstorm 
Sandy, a peer storm to Katrina, was far lower at 132.157 In the past, wholesale failure was 
required (WWII, OEC, and Katrina) before a course correction was made with the mandate 
of legislation or the self-awareness of a McChrystal or DSC. Multi-disciplined leadership 
development is a worthy investment and preferable course of action to allowing history  
to repeat itself. The experiences and lessons learned by today’s DCSs must be captured  
and passed on to tomorrow’s by evolving the JQS to better encompass the homeland  
DSCA mission.  
3. Approach  
Based on the research in this thesis, how then should the glaring gap in DSCA 
leadership development be approached? 
a. The MacArthur Approach 
It could be argued that moving from the whole of DoD (as mandated by the GNA) 
to the whole of government should be accomplished with more GNA-type legislation.158 
To borrow from General McChrystal again, that would be like “using complicated 
solutions to attack a complex problem.”159 A top-down mandate is not the answer for the 
bottom-up DSCA mission. While legislation might be a solution, it is not the best solution. 
The best solution involves bottom-up, agile, small-batch programs. Not only is a top-down 
GNA solution less than optimum, but the Officer Professional Military Education Policy 
(OPMEP) itself may need to become more agile to ensure relevant DSCA leadership 
development. Proponents of this type of approach are prone to ask questions like “What do 
we have to do to meet the requirements of the OPMEP?” rather than “How does the 
 
156 “American Soldiers Killed in Iraq up to 2018,” Statista, accessed September 3, 2018, https://www. 
statista.com/statistics/263798/american-soldiers-killed-in-iraq/; “Fatalities by Year and Country: Iraq,” 
iCasualties, accessed August 21, 2019, http://icasualties.org/; and Levenson, “Decade of Destruction.”  
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Whole-of-Government Approach” (master’s thesis, Air University, 2011). 
159 McChrystal et al., Team of Teams, loc. 1301. 
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OPMEP need to change to accommodate the new complex environment and DSCA 
mission?” “MacArthur solutions” are rooted in established structure and “the way we have 
always done it.” This is not to say that all previous processes and structures are useless, but 
using them as a barrier to mission requirements is unacceptable. The requirements are 
spelled out in the previous section’s conclusions. When discourse on possible solutions to 
the glaring gap arises, participants must have the vision to be McChrystals, not 
MacArthurs. In that light, the MECC should advise the CJCS to approve DSCA leadership 
development with an eye toward what is needed rather than to what is currently procedural. 
If they will not, then Congress should.  
b. The McChrystal Approach 
The point in highlighting approaches here is not to condemn established processes 
and procedures but rather to highlight the dangers in becoming paralyzed by them. 
McChrystal did not do away with the O&I briefing; he made it better by making it 
transparent and inclusive to create a shared consciousness, a complete paradigm shift away 
from the previous “need to know” policy. “McChrystal solutions” are innovative, bottom-
up solutions that are not constrained by conventional approaches and procedures. They are 
agile, pioneer new ground, and think outside the box. Pioneers throughout this thesis 
represent the McChrystal approach. Eric Reis thought outside the box in creating agile 
development for software design. Toyota’s genchi gembutsu was unconventional 
thinking—until it was not. Steve Blank’s Lean startup methodology of build, measure, and 
learn made no sense in the industrial age when a company’s reign on the Standard and 
Poor’s 500 was 60 years. The National Guard’s purchase of Litening pods was not the “pod 
of choice” then, but it is now. Steve Jobs, Sergey Brin, and Larry Page all created a new 
leadership style that emphasized culture. Admiral Winnefeld did not complain there was 
no structure in place to command troops in different statuses; he created a new structure 
called the dual-status commander. This agile pioneering spirit, not silos or procedural 
restrictions, must be the compass that guides DSCA leadership-development discourse.  
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4. Modify the JQS for DSCA Leadership Development 
Joint leader development within the JQS combines the two pillars of education and 
experience to create a joint qualified officer (see Figure 2, Chapter III). The education pillar 
requires attendance in a certified joint course (JPME). The experience pillar can be satisfied 
by the S-JDA while serving for a qualifying period in a joint duty assignment list billet. 
Another method to obtain credit toward the experience pillar is by participating in 
qualifying events. E-JDA events are reviewed and approved on a case-by-case basis. While 
the JQS is the rigid procedural method to gain JQO status, in the past, the system 
demonstrated agility and adaptability in the changing environment. Figure 2 showed the 
dates of various JPME program additions. Of note are the intelligence-focused program 
added in 2012 and an internationally focused program added in 2014. Additionally, Figure 
11 highlights the roll-out of the E-JDA program with an initial self-nomination deadline 
for the E-JDA event review and approval in 2013. In like fashion, the JQS could adapt by 
accommodating new DSCA-centric qualifications in both the education and experience 
pillars (see Figure 7). While there will undoubtedly be many opinions and debate on how 
to do this—and the devil is most certainly in the details—the following pages detail this 
author’s initial recommendations. Fully developing each recommendation is beyond the 
scope of this thesis. The intent of this thesis is to highlight the need for DSCA leadership 
development, identify qualities required of DSCA leaders, and provide recommendations 
that initiate further discourse, research, and recommendation development.160  
 
160 Regarding approval authority, the DoD’s JPME programs are approved by the chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff on recommendations from MECC. Alternatively, Congress could mandate DSCA JQS 
evolution just as it mandated the evolution of the DoD with the GNA, but this is a less desirable approach. 
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Figure 7. Addition of DSCA to JQS Leader-Development Framework161 
 
161 Adapted from Joint Chiefs of Staff, Officer Professional Military Education Policy. 
 62 
C. DSCA JPME RECOMMENDATIONS 
The focus of JPME depends on the institution that delivers it. The Officer 
Professional Military Education Policy spells out the baseline requirements: “JPME Phase 
II must, by law, include: (1) national security strategy; (2) theater strategy and 
campaigning; (3) joint planning processes and systems; and (4) joint, interagency, 
intergovernmental, and multinational capabilities and the integration of those 
capabilities.”162 However, beyond those baseline requirements, each institution has its own 
focus, unique format, and educational angle. In addition to service-centric programs, there 
are reserve component–centric, joint-centric, information warfare–centric, intelligence-
centric, and international-centric programs. In like fashion, there should be a DSCA-centric 
program. Two suggestions for a DSCA-centric JPME follow.  
1. JPME II: Center for Homeland Defense and Security’s Graduate 
Program 
A plug-and-play option to satisfy the DSCA-centric JPME II criteria would be to 
pair the Center for Homeland Defense and Security (CHDS)’s master’s degree program 
with the Joint and Combined Warfighting School-Hybrid (JCWS-H), formerly Advanced 
Joint Professional Military Education (AJPME).163 
a. CHDS Master’s Degree Program 
Cohorts of approximately 30 students are competitively selected from high 
leadership levels throughout the interagency to create a truly joint environment. This 
program is far more joint than traditional joint PME. Existing joint PME programs may be 
joint in terms of multiple services, but they are still prone to DoD groupthink. The CHDS 
program is a truly whole-of-government joint environment of the highest caliber. As an 
AJPME graduate as well as a CHDS graduate, this author can personally attest that the 
academic rigor and joint applicability of the CHDS program far exceed those of the AJPME 
 
162 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Officer Professional Military Education Policy. 
163 “Joint and Combined Warfighting School-Hybrid (JCWS-H),” Joint Forces Staff College, accessed 
July 19, 2019, https://jfsc.ndu.edu/Academics/Joint-Continuing-and-Distance-Education-School/AJPME-
Overview/. 
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program. The CHDS program consists of 15–20 hours per week for 18 months of distance 
learning (approximately 1,500 hours) plus two weeks in residence every quarter, as well as 
completion of a master’s thesis.164 Because the program is of the highest caliber, the 
relationships forged online and more deeply during the in-residence sessions are robust and 
rooted in a common academic struggle that is extremely challenging. A 2:00 a.m. phone 
call from a fellow cohort member would be welcomed and instantly recognized but also 
enthusiastically engaged. Again, a relationship is worth a thousand processes. Moreover, 
the CHDS alumni network is strong and active with high-level members throughout the 
interagency that are more than willing to help alumni who, by completing the CHDS 
course, have earned respect and are worthy of their time.  
b. Joint and Combined Warfighting School-Hybrid  
The JCWS-H program consists of “252 hours of distance learning coursework and 
two one week in residence sessions.”165 The JCWS-H program, formerly AJPME, was built 
as a tailored program to meet the specific needs of reserve component officers. Based on 
civilian employment and reserve component officers’ time constraints, the JCWS-H 
program represents the minimum level of participation required to attain JPME II.  
c. Combine JCWS-H with the CHDS Master’s Degree Program 
A simple top-down procedural solution would be to combine the two programs 
without regard for the enormous workload. Moreover, why would someone do both 
programs when she could complete the short JCWS-H program to achieve AJPME II? 
Visionaries look deeper for incentives to attract truly motivated DSCA leaders. 
Pioneers will find a way to combine the two programs so that the overall footprint and time 
required do not exceed the original CHDS footprint—even if that means thinking outside 
procedural constraints to break new ground. One way to accomplish this with minimal 
OPMEP turmoil would be to satisfy JPME II by combining the two programs and deleting 
 
164 “Master’s Degree Program,” Center for Homeland Defense and Security, accessed July 19, 2019, 
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content that is unnecessary or covered elsewhere. As mentioned above, “JPME Phase II 
must, by law, include: (1) national security strategy; (2) theater strategy and campaigning; 
(3) joint planning processes and systems; and (4) joint, interagency, intergovernmental, 
and multinational capabilities and the integration of those capabilities.”166 The CHDS 
program covers nearly all four JPME components.  
• National security strategy is covered in the American government and 
comparative government courses.  
• Theater strategy and campaigning are covered in the unconventional 
threat, critical infrastructure, and intelligence courses but would need 
some additional JCWS-H content.  
• Joint planning processes and systems are not covered in the CHDS 
program and would require a module from the JCWS curriculum. That 
said, it is highly unlikely that the active component would ever hand over 
the joint planning process to the reserve component. It is this author’s 
opinion that anything beyond a cursory overview of the planning process 
is a waste of time for reserve-component members. This time is better 
allocated to DSCA-centric studies and should be an area where the 
OPMEP evolves to the needs of the DSCA leader.  
• Joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational capabilities are 
covered extensively and continuously in all of the CHDS courses. For this 
reason, the CHDS program is the premier option for DSCA-centric JPME. 
In order to keep the CHDS footprint from expanding unnecessarily, the CHDS 
intelligence course would be sacrificed to provide bandwidth for areas beyond the needs 
of JCWS-H content. The intelligence course, while valuable, was necessarily held at the 
unclassified level, and military PME in general coupled with real-world classified 
experience would make up for the lost CHDS intelligence course content. The advantage 
of the CHDS option is that it is truly a premier interagency program. In fact, the program 
is ranked first nationally in homeland/national security and emergency management 
graduate programs—with Harvard ranked second—according to the 2018 U.S. News and 
World Report’s best graduate school rankings.167 The downside of this option is that while 
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there are two-week in-residence sessions every quarter, much of the work is done via 
distance learning, and slots would be limited.  
2. JPME II: Best and Brightest Master’s Degree 
The best and brightest minds in our rising generation should be shaped by 
the best and brightest minds from both our military and civilian institutions. 
 —Martin E. Dempsey, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff168 
Another DSCA-centric JPME recommendation is to combine JCWS-H and War 
College credits with the best and brightest professors and university programs nationally 
to create a DSCA-centric master’s degree. The American Council on Education publishes 
a guide to evaluate educational experiences in the armed services.169 These graduate-level 
credits from JCWS-H and the War College would transfer to a local “best and brightest” 
university to constitute half of a master’s degree. The other half of the master’s degree 
credits would be accrued at the approved participating university. This author knows from 
personal experience that such a combination of credits for a master’s degree is feasible, as 
the author was about to begin one such program when accepted into the CHDS master’s 
program. The beauty of this option is that it vastly expands the number of potential slots 
while also accessing many of the best and brightest students and professors that would 
otherwise be unable or unwilling to travel to participate in more traditional models. 
Moreover, this model enables in-residence time and the established relationships that come 
with personal contact because the programs would reside wherever the best and brightest 
live. The only downside is that it would require an aggressive McChrystal pioneering spirit 
to establish the best and brightest programs throughout the nation.  
Many of those best and brightest minds reside in the National Guard network, 
which is woefully under-leveraged. In the past, leadership-development paths have had a 
decidedly active-component approach. Permanent changes of station and multiple 
temporary duty assignments are the norm for the active component but are untenable to 
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many in the reserve component, hence the relatively recent addition of JCWS-H to the 
JPME portfolio. General Dempsey states that one of his desires for joint education is to 
“attract and maintain civilian and military faculty members who are among the very best 
and brightest of their contemporaries.”170 Moreover, he says, “We should also continue to 
recruit the best and brightest from civilian academia and the interagency to expand our 
educational expertise.”171 However, the “best and brightest” are sometimes not the same 
as the “willing and able.” Because leadership development is so important, accepting those 
who are merely willing and able to teach or attend residence courses at JPME institutions 
is unacceptable.  
Unfortunately, however, for many of the best and the brightest, attendance is 
unrealistic. Throughout the nation, there are fantastic National Guard officers that are 
unable to change duty stations to an in-residence course due to parenting plans, limited 
slots, family health issues, and civilian career responsibilities, to name a few. Throughout 
the nation, there are also reputable universities with seasoned professors who would be 
excited to play a part in developing our military leaders if only they did not have to move 
to do it. Each state has an unharnessed collection of not only the best and brightest 
institutions, professors, and students but also the best and brightest from non-governmental 
and interagency organizations. If we truly want the best and the brightest, we have to move 
past the paradigm that they must come to us. Distance learning is helpful; however, face-
to-face involvement builds stronger relationships and understanding. Leveraging the 
National Guard network provides an innovative bottom-up solution to bring together the 
best and brightest throughout the nation. 
D. DSCA S-JDA STANDARD PATH RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. State-Sponsored S-JDA Programs 
This recommendation for S-JDA involves leveraging the National Guard network 
to the fullest extent to create state- or region-specific S-JDA billets. Every state has distinct 
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opportunities and challenges and a distinct identity. In searching for innovative ways to 
fulfill the experience requirements to become a JQO, the JQS should leverage the National 
Guard network to produce agile, bottom-up S-JDA billets. For example, a program 
sponsored by California might leverage Silicon Valley in ways that pioneer cyber. Arizona 
might build an experience program that breaks new ground on border operations. 
Louisiana’s proposal might produce valuable lessons learned in disaster relief efforts. New 
York may generate new approaches to terrorism response. In some cases, where 
opportunities are few or the pool of best and brightest is scarce, states might band together 
to build a regional program. Although each state would tailor its plan to unique challenges 
and opportunities of the state, the common vision that strategic and senior leader guidance 
provides would steer state content and establish the bar for program approval.  
Just as McChrystal used his authority to create a framework that enabled a team of 
teams, so too could the CJCS use his authority to create a framework that enables states to 
create S-JDA billets that are centers of excellence in their unique fields. Current joint duty 
assignment list (JDAL) billets are most certainly tailored to specific job tasks; DSCA JDAL 
billets would be no different. The California DSCA billet would likely be the premier cyber 
billet in the nation if Silicon Valley were leveraged properly. The same could be said for 
other states’ particular areas of expertise. Certainly, having a center of excellence in one’s 
state does not automatically guarantee that a premier program can be built, but the National 
Guard network is most likely to have the relationships that make a state-sponsored S-JDA 
program possible. Figure 8 depicts a hypothetical S-JDA cyber billet sponsored by the 
California National Guard as an example of how a state might create such a billet. The 
purpose of this example is merely to illustrate the notion that a bottom-up solution could 
generate a level of creativity, adaptability, and agility that no rigid, top-down OPMEP 
could hope to.  
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Figure 8. Hypothetical JQO Cyber Billet, Sponsored by the California National Guard 
a. JPME II: Best and Brightest Master’s Program 
In this example, California has chosen to focus its program on cyber and selected 
the best and brightest path to satisfy the JPME education requirement. The California 
National Guard has paired with the Stanford University’s Cyber Policy Center at the 
Freeman Spogli Institute as the best and brightest institution for its master’s degree 
program. Half of the master’s credits will come from Stanford, and the other half will 
transfer from the national defense university colleges. At the completion of the master’s 
program, the student will be JPME II complete.  
b. S-JDA: Cyber JDAL Billet  
For the experience requirement, the California National Guard has a wealth of 
opportunities in the state to leverage the cyber domain.  
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• State partnership program fellowship: California partners with Nigeria and 
Ukraine.172 On December 23, 2015, Ukraine suffered a large-scale 
coordinated and sophisticated cyber warfare attack.173 California might 
choose to leverage its relationship with Ukraine by creating a fellowship 
that collaborates and studies the attack to prevent similar attacks against 
U.S. critical infrastructure. 
• Fortune 500 fellowships: The DoD is no stranger to the Fortune 500 
company fellowship idea; however, these fellowships are generally 
inaccessible. National Guard relationships within a state can be leveraged 
to increase these kinds of invaluable experience opportunities. For 
California, the list of Fortune 500 companies just in the valley is 
impressive and presents an unusually rich landscape to work from in 
building a cyber fellowship. 
• Interagency fellowships: The interagency is another area in which 
California has many options to create a meaningful DSCA fellowship as 
part of the S-JDA experience path. Oakland is home to a regional office of 
DHS Cybersecurity.174 The California governor also has a Cybersecurity 
Task Force that brings together public and private expertise.175 
Additionally, FEMA’s Region IX is in Oakland.176 Again, there is no 
shortage of opportunity for a valuable DSCA experience.  
The challenge for California in creating its S-JDA would be to find the balance 
between specific and wave top. If there are too many fellowships, the officer is receiving 
only a simple wave-top perspective of the issues that the host organization faces. If there 
are too few fellowships, the officer will get too deep in the weeds of what the host 
organization faces. Establishing relationships and understanding the challenges of the host 
organization is the objective.  
 
172 “State Partnership Program,” National Guard, accessed July 19, 2019, https://www.nationalguard. 
mil/Leadership/Joint-Staff/J-5/International-Affairs-Division/State-Partnership-Program/. 
173 Julia E. Sullivan and Dmitriy Kamensky, “How Cyber-Attacks in Ukraine Show the Vulnerability 
of the U.S. Power Grid,” Electricity Journal 30, no. 3 (April 2017): 30–35, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tej. 
2017.02.006. 
174 “Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency’s Regional Offices,” Department of Homeland 
Security, accessed August 24, 2019, https://www.dhs.gov/cisa/cisa-regional-offices. This regional office is 
the DHS Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency’s Infrastructure Security Division. 
175 “Cybersecurity Task Force,” California Governor’s Office of Emergency Services, accessed July 
19, 2019, https://www.caloes.ca.gov/cal-oes-divisions/cybersecurity-task-force. 
176 “Regional Contact Information,” Federal Emergency Management Agency, accessed July 19, 2019, 
https://www.fema.gov/regional-contact-information. 
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2. NORTHCOM-Sponsored S-JDA Program 
While states definitely have unique challenges and opportunities to solve and can 
certainly leverage them in creating a state-sponsored S-JDA program, United States 
Northern Command (NORTHCOM) is in a unique position to create a regional/combatant 
commander S-JDA program. Every morning, the North American Aerospace Defense 
Command (NORAD) and USNORTHCOM commander receives an O&I briefing. In 
attendance are the usual joint directors, but around the circumference of the large room are 
dozens of interagency LNOs from every agency imaginable.  
One COA might be for USNORTHCOM to develop a combatant commander–
sponsored DSCA S-JDA billet whereby the service member is given access to and 
instruction from the various agency LNOs assigned to the command. On the plus side, 
practically every agency is represented at the command, and when real-world events occur, 
LNOs are included in most meetings as with the transparent O&I briefings of 
McChrystal.177 On the downside, when there is no real-world mission or Tier 1 exercise 
happening, much of the “experience” would have to come from tabletop discussions with 
the various LNOs, and slots would be limited. On the flip side, having officers from the 
various state-sponsored S-JDA programs attend USNORTHCOM’s Tier 1 Ardent Sentry 
exercise as LNO/observers would be time well spent.  
3. Empowered Execution 
A top-down, definitive, proscriptive, mandated program is not what is needed. 
Bottom-up programs developed within the JQS framework by the innovation of small 
teams (states or regions) are the answer. McChrystal did not abrogate his authority; he used 
it in a way that enabled a bottom-up approach and a team of teams. He discovered that the 
best use of his top-down authority was to create a framework that would generate 
adaptability and agility. He called it empowered execution. The CJCS, on recommendation 
from the MECC, should do the same and allow states and regions to develop adaptable and 
agile S-JDA billets.  
 
177 The author served as the First Air Force and Air Force’s northern LNO to the commander of 
NORAD and USNORTHCOM. 
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Leveraging the best and brightest people and programs in a state or region is the 
goal. The best and brightest from government, non-governmental organizations, military, 
politics, corporations, state-partnership programs, nation-state consulates, embassies, 
universities, and more should all be considered in building small-batch state or region 
programs to submit for approval as S-JDA programs. In many cases, existing DoD S-JDA 
JDAL billets involve a single joint-matters process repeated over and over throughout a 
multi-year assignment. A best and brightest S-JDA state- or region-sponsored program 
would have infinitely greater joint value for the DSCA enterprise. Leveraging the National 
Guard’s trusted bottom-up teams is the way for DSCA leadership development to succeed 
in the complex information age. It will require vision and the courage to fail. Some 
programs may fail, but the key is to fail small, and fail early. Learn and pivot—that is the 
way of the startup. To borrow a metaphor from A Team of Teams, JQS should lead like a 
gardener: water valuable programs and prune lackluster ones.  
E. DSCA E-JDA EXPERIENCE PATH RECOMMENDATIONS 
Before E-JDA, there was only one path to satisfy the experience pillar of the JQS: 
fill a published JDAL billet. JQS was modified (see Appendix A) to include a second 
method, E-JDA, to satisfy the experience pillar toward becoming a JQO. E-JDA is a 
process whereby service members can receive joint points for joint experience in other than 
S-JDA JDAL billets. For example, with the new E-JDA program, a war planner 
coordinating and planning the theater game plan with other nations would receive joint 
credit for that downrange deployment even though he was not technically in an official 
S-JDA JDAL billet. The amount of credit depends on “what you do” and “whom you do it 
with” (see Appendix A). Service members can self-nominate for experiences that they 
believe are worthy of joint points. The nomination is evaluated, and joint points are either 
approved or denied. The complaint was that the paper pusher back home at an S-JDA JDAL 
billet desk was earning joint points while the warfighter downrange working directly with 
coalition warfighting forces was not. Common sense prevailed, and the JQS evolved to 
create E-JDA in response to the evolution of the mission.  
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This new E-JDA path means that actual joint experiences result in joint points 
creditable toward becoming a JQO. DSCs operate in the most joint environment 
imaginable, the interagency. DSCs who serve for real-world events should receive E-JDA 
credit for their indisputably joint experience. In addition, there are likely other DSCA 
experiences that would qualify for E-JDA points on a case-by-case basis in exactly the 
same way that downrange experiential credit is given. 
1. E-JDA Credit for Real-World Emergency Events 
Some examples that should qualify for experience-based joint points include 
• Hurricane Harvey: Dual Status Commander 
• Hurricane Irma: Dual Status Commander 
• Hurricane Maria: Dual Status Commander 
2. E-JDA Credit for Qualifying DSCA Training 
Just as there are qualified downrange training events that meet the benchmark for 
E-JDA points, so too should qualifying DSCA training events be eligible for E-JDA points. 
One example of a DSCA training program that should qualify for E-JDA points is the 
Colorado OutReach Exchange Program.  
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Figure 9. Colorado OutReach Exchange178 
 
178 Source: “Mission,” Colorado OutReach Exchange, accessed August 24, 2019, 
http://coloradooutreachexchange.org/. 
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Two members of the “Colorado 30,” a group of the most influential leaders in 
Colorado, founded the not-for-profit Colorado OutReach Exchange Program (CORE). One 
of the founding members of CORE is a global-level businessman, and the other is a retired 
major general with vast political connections. Together, they have managed to build and 
fund a program that is essentially a small-scale version of the state- or region-sponsored 
S-JDA JDAL billet. Their business and political connections span the full-spectrum 
interagency.179  
The content of the CORE program was built with time constraints of the citizen-
soldier working a full-time civilian job as well as an operational Guard job. As such, the 
2013 program consisted of only four training days, a 30,000-foot overview, if you will. 
The focus of day one was personal and professional development, which included an 
insights discovery assessment of each individual’s leadership style. The focus of day two 
was government and politics, complete with a mock hearing where participants were grilled 
in a room at the capitol by a committee of actual General Assembly members. The focus 
of day three was the business community. The morning was filled with guest speakers from 
the top tier of the Denver business community, followed by a dirty bomb tabletop scenario 
facilitated by the ANSER Corporation with media, local hospital, business leaders, and 
CORE students as participants. Day four was inter-agency, incorporating a tabletop 
exercise and lessons learned discussion on the Waldo Canyon wildfire, which burned 
hundreds of homes in the Colorado Springs area. There was representation from 
USNORTHCOM, the U.S. Forest Service, the American Red Cross, the DSC’s J3, a former 
FEMA Region VIII administrator, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Colorado 
Department of Public Safety, and two county sheriffs. Additionally, the lunch-break guest 
speaker was the former chief of the National Guard Bureau, General Frank Grass.  
CORE has packed a considerable amount of top-tier content into a four-day 
baseline program. Give CORE the time that a DSCA S-JDA billet affords, and the result 
will be nothing short of a world-class program that involves students in a full spectrum of 
experiences using real-world methods to which no book or in-residence classroom could 
 
179 This is an example of the kind of trusting relationships the National Guard brings to the table. These 
relationships will enable the creation of the S-JDA programs. 
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aspire. CORE is the type of experience that most certainly should qualify for E-JDA joint 
points. Nevertheless, this is only a four-day program, but those four days of joint DSCA 
experience far outweigh the four days spent at the copier in building two on a slow summer 
day at USNORTHCOM while in a JDAL billet. The E-JDA program needs to open the 
aperture to include DSCA events for joint points, and DSCs of real-world events are not 
the only experiences worthy of them.  
F. FINAL THOUGHTS 
The world is evolving. The information age has brought with it an unprecedented 
level of access and has thereby transformed what used to be a complicated environment 
into a complex one. The downrange mission has evolved in response by shifting to a 
bottom-up team-of-teams mindset that recognizes how the new environment requires 
adaptability and agility. The homeland mission has stagnated. Evolving the JQS to include 
DSCA-specific paths will be the spark that enables the homeland mission to catch up with 
the downrange mission. JPME II can be satisfied with a nearly off-the-shelf CHDS 
program or by tapping into the best and brightest universities throughout the nation.  
The National Guard network is an in-place team of teams with existing 
relationships and opportunities that are wholly underutilized but could be used to create 
incredibly valuable centers of excellence for S-JDA billets. E-JDA opportunities are 
abundant in the National Guard as well, not only during national-level emergencies like 
Hurricane Katrina and Superstorm Sandy but also during smaller state emergencies that do 
not reach the presidential level. It is time for the JQS and the OPMEP to recognize that the 
homeland mission needs to evolve toward a DSCA-specific leadership development that 
emphasizes bottom-up agility and that the National Guard network is the in-place team of 
teams with the relationships and ability to make it happen. 
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APPENDIX A.  THE JOINT QUALIFICATION SYSTEM 
 
Figure 10. Joint Qualification System Primer, Page 1180 
 
180 Source: Department of Defense, “Joint Qualification System (JQS) Primer” (fact sheet, 




Figure 11. Joint Qualification System Primer, Page 2181 
 
181 Source: Department of Defense, 2. 
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APPENDIX B.  DEFINITIONS 
The following definitions appear in the glossary of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff Instruction entitled Officer Professional Military Education Policy.182 
CAPSTONE: A mandated course for newly selected GO/FOs. The course objective is to 
make these individuals more effective in planning and employing U.S. Forces in joint and 
combined operations. The CAPSTONE curriculum examines major issues affecting 
national security decision making, military strategy, joint and combined doctrine, 
interoperability, and key allied nation issues 
 
Joint Advanced Warfighting School (JAWS): A course designed to produce graduates 
that can create campaign-quality concepts, employ all elements of national power, 
accelerate transformation, succeed as joint force operational/strategic planners and 
commanders and be creative, conceptual, adaptive, and innovative. JAWS is envisioned to 
populate the Joint Staff and Combatant Commands with officers expert in the joint 
planning processes and capable of critical analysis in the application of all aspects of 
national power across the full range of military operations.  
 
Joint Matters: Matters related to the achievement of unified action by integrated military 
forces in operations conducted across domains such as land, sea, air, space, or in the 
information environment, including matters relating to national military strategy; strategic 
planning and contingency planning; command and control of operations under unified 
command; national security planning with other departments and agencies of the United  
States; and combined operations with military forces of allied nations. “Multiple military 
forces” refers to forces that involve participants from the Armed Forces and one or more 
of the other departments and agencies of the United States; military forces or agencies of 
other countries; and non-governmental persons and entities.  
 
Joint Professional Military Education (JPME): A CJCS-approved body of objectives, 
outcomes, policies, procedures and standards supporting the educational requirements for 
joint officer management. JPME phases: A three-phase joint education program taught at 
Service intermediate- or senior-level colleges, Joint Forces Staff College, and NDU that 
meets the educational requirements for joint officer management.  
 
a. JPME Phase-I: A first phase of JPME is incorporated into the curriculums of 
intermediate- and senior-level Service colleges and other appropriate educational 
programs, which meet JPME criteria and are accredited by the Chairman. By law, 
the subject matter to be covered shall include at least the following: 1) national 
military strategy; 2) Joint planning at all levels of war; 3) Joint doctrine; 4) Joint 
command and control; and 5) Joint Force and joint requirements development.  
 
182 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Officer Professional Military Education Policy, GL-7–8. 
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b. JPME Phase-II: A follow-on second phase of JPME for selected graduates of 
Service schools and other appropriate education programs that complements and 
enhances Phase-I instruction. This phase is taught at JFSC JCWS to both 
intermediate- and senior-level students and at Service senior-level colleges to 
senior-level students, and completes their educational requirement for joint officer 
management. In addition to the subjects specified in JPME Phase I above, by law, 
the curriculum for Phase II JPME shall include the following: 1) national security 
strategy; 2) theater strategy and campaigning; 3) Joint planning processes and 
systems; and 4) Joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational 
capabilities and the integration of those capabilities.  
 
c. CAPSTONE: CAPSTONE is designated by title 10, U.S.C., as the third phase 
of a tiered approach to JPME. 
 
Joint Qualification System (JQS): An officer designated by the Secretary of Defense, 
with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who is educated 
and trained in joint matters and has completed the Level 3 requirements for JQS 
designation. An officer must be in the grade of O-4 or above to be designated a JQS.  
 
Joint training: Military training based on joint doctrine or JTTP to prepare individuals, 
joint commanders, joint staff, and joint forces to respond to strategic and operational 
requirements deemed necessary by Combatant Commanders to execute their assigned 
missions. Joint training involves forces of two or more Military Departments interacting 
with a Combatant Commander or subordinate Joint Force commander; involves joint forces 
and/or joint staffs; and/or individuals preparing to serve on a joint staff or in a joint 
organization and is conducted using joint doctrine or TTP.  
 
National Guard Dual-Status Commander: Title 32 U.S.C. § 325(a)(2), provides limited 
authority for a National Guard officer to serve simultaneously in both state and Federal 
statuses. The dual-status commander can concurrently command both Federal (Title 10) 
and state (Title 32, State Active Duty) forces. This dual status requires the authority of the 
President (currently delegated to the SECDEF) and the consent of the officer’s Governor 
to serve in both duty statuses. 
 
Posse Comitatus: The entire body of the inhabitants who may be summoned by the sheriff 
to assist in preserving the public peace (as in a riot) or in executing a legal precept that is 
forcibly opposed including under the common law every male inhabitant who is above 15 
years of age and not infirm.  
 
Professional Military Education (PME): PME conveys the broad body of knowledge 
and develops the habits of mind essential to the military professional’s expertise in the art 
and science of war.  
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The Onion Router (TOR): An open-source software program that allows users to protect 
their privacy and security against a common form of Internet surveillance known as traffic 
analysis. Tor was originally developed for the U.S. Navy in an effort to protect government 
communications. The name of the software originated as an acronym for The Onion 
Router, but Tor is now the official name of the program. 
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